The effects of the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel on Israel's economy and human resources by Shafir, Israel
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-06
The effects of the immigration of Soviet Jews to
Israel on Israel's economy and human resources
Shafir, Israel








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
THE EFFECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL ON ISRAEL'S
ECONOMY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
by
Israel Shafir
Lieutenant Colonel, Israeli Air Force
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of





:urity Classification of this page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
i Report Security Classification: Unclassified lb Restrictive Markings
i Security Classification Authority
) Declassification/Downgrading Schedule
3 Distribution/Availability of Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)




7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
: Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
lonterey CA 93943-5000
7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey CA 93943-5000
i Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organization 6b Office Symbol
(if applicable)
9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number
ddress (city, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers
Program Element No Project No Task No Work Unit Accession I
Title (include security classification) THE EFFECT OF THE IMMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS TO ISRAEL ON ISRAEL'S
CONOMY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
Personal Author(s) ISRAEL SAHAFTR








> Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position
f the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Cosati Codes
eld Group Subgroup
18 Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Immigration, Israel, Jews, Economy, Human Resources, Strategy, Vision
> Abstract (continue on reverse ifnecessary and identify by block number)
his thesis investigates the expected effects of the 1990s immigration wave of Jews from the former USSR to Israel in terms of til
;onomic and social aspects. The influx of some 500,000 immigrants has incremented Israel's population by some 10 percent in
iree years. The immigrants' human capital is considered exceptionally high in educational and occupational terms. It can give
rael a labor force of unparalleled quality assuming it will not be wasted.
The Israeli economic structure is heavily regulated and lacks incentives for entrepreneurialism. The challenge facing
rael is to transform its economic political and social structure so it is geared toward harnessing the special opportunity accorded
/ the immigrants.
In the fast changing global market, capitalizing on the immigrants characteristics is a key for Israel's success. The
omigrants pose a burden as well in the form of public debt to be incurred by the veteran population in the near future for their
iccessful assimilation. Israel's ability to find the right approach to their absorption depends on its ability to forge a strategic
sion for the future and follow it to implementation.
• Distribution/Availability of Abstract
unclassified/unlimited same as report DTIC users
21 Abstract Security Classification
Unclassified
& Name of Responsible Individual
oger D. Evered




)FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
security classification of this p
Unclassif
ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the expected effects of the 1990s immigration wave of Jews
from the former USSR to Israel in terms of the economic and social aspects. The influx of
some 500,000 immigrants has incremented Israel's population by some 10 percent in three
years. The immigrants' human capital is considered exceptionally high in educational and
occupational terms. It can give Israel a labor force of unparalleled quality assuming it will
not be wasted.
The Israeli economic structure is heavily regulated and lacks incentives for
entrepreneurialism The challenge facing Israel is to transform its economic political and
social structure so it is geared toward harnessing the special opportunity accorded by the
immigrants.
In the fast changing global market, capitalizing on the irnmigrants characteristics is
a key for Israel's success. The immigrants pose a burden as well in the form of public debt
to be incurred by the veteran population in the near future for their successful assimilation.
Israel's ability to find the right approach to their absorption depends on its ability to forge






II. ISRAEL'S ECONOMY - AN OVERVIEW . 3
A. A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRANTS 3
B. THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION 3
C. TIES WITH WORLD JEWRY 5
D. THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 5
E. PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION . 7
F. EDUCATION 9
G. LABOR 9
H. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION 10
I. COMMERCE AND TRADE 10
J. TOURISM 11
K. IMMIGRATION AND PRODUCT 11
L. ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 16





A. CAUSES OF SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION IN THE
90'S 19
1. SOVIET IMMIGRATION POLICY 19
2. SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS 20
3. SOVIET ECONOMY 20
4. ANTI-SEMITISM 20
B. POPULATION ACCUMULATION 21
C. SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 24
D. AGE STRUCTURE 24
E. LEVEL OF EDUCATION 25
F. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 26
G. OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION 27
H. CAPITAL IMPORTS 29
IV. ECONOMIC OPENING CONDITIONS FOR ABSORPTION 30
A. EFFICIENCY MEASURES 30
B. INVESTMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT . 31
C. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 35
1. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 35
2. ACADEMICALLY TRAINED PERSONNEL 36
D. STRUCTURAL REFORM 37
E. PRIVATIZATION 39
F. REFORMS IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 39
G. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 40
H. INCREASES IN LABOR SUPPLY AND RISING
UNEMPLOYMENT 42
I. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIES AND
OCCUPATIONS 43
J. FLEXIBILITY OF THE WAGE SYSTEM 44
V. THEORY OF ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION AND ITS
APPLICABILITY 46
A. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 47
B. UNEMPLOYMENT 48
C. JOB DISPLACEMENT 49
D. OCCUPATIONAL SUBSTITUTION 51
E. FERTILITY 57
F. MORTALITY 58
G. EARNINGS COMPARISONS 58
H. MOBILITY 59
I. PROPENSITY TO START NEW BUSINESS 59
J. CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS 60
K. CRIME 60
L. EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANTS ON PUBLIC COFFERS 61
VI
M. EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS THROUGH DILUTION OF
PRODUCTION CAPITAL 63
N. HUMAN CAPITAL EXTERNALITIES 65
O. IMPACT UPON NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 66
P. CONCLUSION 67
VI IMMIGRATION ABSORPTION 1989-1992 THE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES 70
A. THE POLITICAL ASPECT 71
B. THE ECONOMIC ASPECT 75
C. THE CULTURAL ASPECT 78
VII PROJECTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE . . 83
A. PUBLISHED PLANS 83
B. ECONOMIC POLICY PLANS 84
C. BUDGET PLANS 86
D. STRUCTURAL CHANGES 86
E. MONETARY POLICY 87
VIII PROPOSITION FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING 88
A. STRENGTHS 89
Vll
1. EDUCATION LEVEL 89
2. OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION 90
3. KNOWLEDGE MARKET ENVIRONMENT 90
B. WEAKNESSES 91
1. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 92
2. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 93
3. SECURITY 94
4. GEOGRAPHICAL SEGREGATION 95
C. OPPORTUNITIES-THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY . 95
D. THREATS 97
E. A VISION 98
F. PROPOSED STRATEGY 102
G. CONCLUSION 106
LIST OF REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 107
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 114
Vlll
I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Israel was established to be a national home for the Jewish
people. Towards this end, the founders of Israel proclaimed in its Declaration
of Independence that; "...the Jewish State in the land of Israel...will open wide
the gates of the homeland to every Jew...".
True to the Zionist vision and its perceived historic mission, Israel has
absorbed over two million immigrants from the time of its inception in 1948 to
the beginning ofthe current wave ofimmigration from the former Soviet Union
in 1989. The evolution of the Zionist movement and the previous absorption
experience have profoundly affected the Israeli economy. It is a highly
regulated, government controlled economy which turned from being a supposed
asset at the country's beginning stage to a liability, in the quest for economic
development in the 90s. The characteristics ofthe present wave ofimmigration
of some 500,000 people poses a great challenge and an opportunity for the
Israeli economy and society to emerge from this experience as a vitalized
"David" (in the sense ofbeing a small agile high-tech oriented economy), lifting
itself to a prominent place within the industrialized countries. The challenge
calls for Israel to effect a structural change in its economy and accept the
resulting social changes which will inevitably lead to political and maybe geo-
political strategic realignment in Israel and the Middle east.
This thesis investigates the expected effects of the immigrants on the
Israeli economy and society. The purpose of this analysis is to examine how
the immigrants' characteristics could be used to enhance the Israeli economy
by way of strategic restructuring.
II. ISRAEL'S ECONOMY - AN OVERVIEW
This chapter presents an overview of the Israeli economy with an
emphasis on the role immigration has played in the process of economic
development from 1919.
A. A COUNTRY OF IMMIGRANTS
Israel is a country established for and run by immigrants from diverse
countries and backgrounds. Its raison d'etre is to gather, retain, and forge
these immigrants into one nation. Preventing splits along lines of origin was,
and still is a major objective in Israel's development as a welfare state, and
discouraging emigration is a constraint on economic policy. The early
immigrants' ideologies and aspirations, and the institutions created to achieve
them, have had a lasting effect on the country's social and economic structure.
In particular they have had a marked effect on the role assumed by Israeli
governments.
B. THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION
The political orientation of the leaders of the zionist movement affected
their perceptions of the role of the administration (be it governmental or quasi
formal institution), in regulating and controlling the economy. Most of the
leaders had come to 'Palestine' on the wave of radical socialism which swept
Europe, and East European intelligencia in particular. The waves of
immigration of idealistic Jews seeking to find refuge from racial persecution
in Europe came to the middle east and established communes, known as
Kibbutz, which essentially enabled them to survive through effort-pooling and
a very low standard ofliving. Work was centrally organized and workers were
rotated on shifts to equate their hardships. Little room was left for personal
needs outside of what was approved by the main consensus. Practically
everything was decided upon through central meetings in which ideological and
personal issues were defined. Regulations were subjected to strict political
party line doctrine. Any deviation was subdued and could be a cause for
ousting an individual from the community, and subsequently from the socialist
party. As a result several factions emerged. None the less most were housed
under the roof of a central coalition which was the quasi-governmental
institution prior to the declaration of independence in 1948. By no means did
the Kibbutzim (pi. of Kibbutz) constitute the majority of the population, but
their role as paradigm makers for the society cannot be overemphasized. The
importance of the socialist zionist movement was so profound, that it came to
dominate the strategic thinking of the elite. In conjunction with the recurring
waves ofimmigrations the socialist philosophy ofgovernment central planning,
resource allocations was unchallenged for decades.
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C. TIES WITH WORLD JEWRY
Immigration is one aspect of a broader affinity with Jews world wide.
This strong and lasting relationship has concrete implications for the country's
resources and its balance of payments. As a haven for survivors of the
Holocaust, Israel received German reparations at a crucial stage in its
economic development, during the huge immigration wave ofthe 50 s. Transfers
from world Jewry have been Israel's most consistent source of external
financing. This aid, which is especially responsive to emergencies, provides a
safety net. Large funding drives were of particular importance in both wars of
1967 and 1973 (the 'Six Days war' and Tom Kippur war' as they have come to
be known), and the Soviet Jewish immigration wave at present. These ties
were instrumental in forming the close economic and political links between
Israel and the United States, which have affected life in Israel in many ways.
D. THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
Perceiving a threat to its survival, Israel devoted an increasingly large
share of its resources to defense and to conducting economic and social
activities in the context of constant preparedness for overt and covert
hostilities. Existence in a hostile environment isolated Israel from adjacent
economies and obstructed - until very recently - economic relations with
countries in the former eastern block and parts of the third world. In addition,
an economic boycott of potential western trade partners by Arab countries
affected economic performance as well. Israel's resource allocation to defense
is probably the highest in the world as a percent of G.N.P.
There are also hidden costs associated with Israel's defense in the form
of comparatively high quality and quantity of manpower devoted to the
military. The reserve duty taxation of the civilian sector is also a heavy burden
in the actual productive loss and the disruptive nature of spending some 30-60
days a year on military duty. An important though somewhat unquantifiable
phenomenon is that the elite reserve men who serve as combat officers and
troopers (whose average reserve duty is higher) constitute a high percentage
of the economic, social and academic elite.
Table 2.1 presents the defense burden from 1950 to 1990.
The table shows an exceptionally high expenditure on defense, but a shift
down during the latter part of the 80s owing to the relative feeling of security
regarding an imminent total attack on Israel by its neighbors. This can be
attributed in part to the peace with Egypt and the relative weakness of Israel's
main adversary - Syria. The defense expenditure can be expected to drop
farther in accordance with the easing of international and regional tensions,
and the decline in Iraqi potential military threat.
TABLE 2.1
DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENT OF GNP









* Excluding years of war
Sources: CBS, Monthly Bulletin Supplement 6/1982 and abstract, 1991.
E. PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION
In most respects Israel's economic structure resembles that of industrial
European countries. Commerce and banking, transportation and
communication, and personal and government services account for over half of
its national product. The high percentage is due to several reasons, the most
important of which is the immigrant's preference for their traditional
occupation[Ref. 1]. Immigrants to Israel were Jews who were not
allowed to enter into many occupational fields in their countries of origin.
Their insecurity led them to easily transferable and mobile occupations, and
as a result of this and other reasons, they typically engaged in commerce,
banking, medical profession and the like.
Agriculture: Agriculture employs about 5% of the labor force and is
responsible for an equal share of the G.N.P. Israel's agriculture provides
almost all the food needs of the country with export surplus roughly offsetting
imports. Agriculture in Israel is one of the most technologically advanced in
the world through effective use of centralized production methods (namely
communal farming methods), and high valued manpower employed in that
field. (The education level of those employed in agriculture is probably the
highest in the world. The explanation being that the Zionist paradigm called
for the immigrants to employ themselves in agriculture. The paradigm still has
an effect on labor preferences).
Industry: Industry employs almost a third of the labor force and
generates about the same proportion of GNP. The major enterprises are
electronics, aviation, diamond polishing, food products, construction, textiles,
machine and metal products, chemicals, rubber and plastics.
In spite of the lack of natural resources and the dependence on imports
for raw material (especially energy resources) Israel was able to diversify
considerably, and has been able to sell its goods in the world markets.
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F. EDUCATION
Education in Israel is mandatory and free for the first 13 years.
Expenditure on education is about 8.7 percent of GDP. University level
education is considered of a very high standard by international comparison
and is highly subsidized. The rate of graduates entering the labor force has not
been equaled by job opportunity growth rate and as result many veteran
Israelis have emigrated, mainly to the United States. This brain drain is a
severe constraint on Israel's economy in the form of acceptable policy
measures.
Between 1975-1990 the number of students increased by 35 percent. In
contrast student enrollment, between 1990-1996 is expected to increase by 40
percent due to structural age changes and the immigration[Ref. 2].
G. LABOR
Virtually all workers in Israel are Unionized. The main union - the
Histadrut- embraces 70% of the total work force. This has led to an integrated
national wage system. The trade unions provide extensive services such as
health care, child care and other services. This gives them virtual veto power
in negotiations with the government over wage, labor, and general economic
policy decisions.
Wage levels in the Israeli market tend to demonstrate an attribute of
inflexibility. This is caused by an imbalance between the trade unions and the
private sector in which the former dictated labor policy and wages to the latter.
Unemployment was kept at a tolerable low rate as all governments have
been aware that social unrest as a result of high unemployment would
undermine prospects of immigration and would stimulate
emigration[Ref 3].
H. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION
Israel inherited a relatively good infrastructure from the British
investments at the pre-state period. Extensive improvements were made to
accommodate the growing population and structural changes to industry.
However, the infrastructure development is lagging and suffers from under
investment in the last decade (see table 4.1 in Chapter IV). Since Israel
depends on sea and air routes for its external communication due to its
inability to use land routes, the government has vested interests and shares
in both El-Al the main air carrier, and Zim, the main sea carrier.
I. COMMERCE AND TRADE
Domestic trade is well developed and is characterized by many large scale
cooperatives as well as small retailers. Israel is a very active participant in
international trade, but for most of its existence it has maintained a trade
deficit financed by borrowing and funds from abroad. Israel main trade
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partners are the United States and the European Common Market countries.
As of late an effort was made to diversify the trading partners to include the
far east and the CIS.
J. TOURISM
Tourism is fairly well developed in Israel. Its cultural, archeological and
religious attractions coupled with favorable climate make it a favorite
destination to various groups, mainly Jews. The unstable security situation
makes tourism somewhat unpredictable, but none the less, some one million
tourists arrive each year contributing substantially to the economy. Fiscal
figures for 1989 were $1.8 billion which was about 4.2 percent of the GNP with
an added value of 85 percent (an added value leader among export industries).
K. IMMIGRATION AND PRODUCT
In 1919 the Jewish population in Palestine (which was then under British
mandate) was 57,000[Ref. 4]. 95,600 arrived in 1920-1926, adding 9-15
percent to the population each year (28.3 percent in 1926 alone). In 1932 the
Jewish population was 175,000; 147,000 immigrants arrived in 1933-1935,
adding 17-20 percent annually and another 30,000 came in 1936.
In the quarter century before 1948 the Jewish population increased eight
fold with the population doubling on the average each decade and reached
approximately 650,000 by the end of that period.
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Immigrants of the pre state years were highly educated and motivated.
Many of the immigrants came with substantial monetary capital which helps
to explain the outstanding economic performance at the time (see Table 2.2).
From mid 1948 to the end of 1951 687,000 immigrants arrived with the
population more than doubling to 1.4 million. In the next two decades it
redoubled growing 47 and 35 percent respectively. The influx of the 1950s
wave ofimmigration was comprised of individuals with different demographic
and economic background. The immigrants were less educated and had arrived
with virtually no material possessions.
The 1970s marked the end of an exceptionally high and sustained period
of population growth, with an increase of 26 percent for the decade. Over the
period of 1948-1982, the Jewish population grew from 650,000 to 3.4 millions
with immigration contributing 1,385,000.
From 1950 to 1982 total product increased eleven fold and capital stock
sixteen fold. Product tripled in the first decade and doubled in the second but
from 1972 to 1982 total product increased by only 37 percent. Per capita
income increased at an annual rate of 4.8 percent in the British mandate
period and 5.2 in the 1951-1972 period, (data for 1948-1950 is less reliable). In
contrast it grew only 0.8 percent in the period 1972-1982.
Figure 1 shows the correspondence between the ratio of immigrants to
mean Jewish population and the growth rate of GNP. The correlation is .72
in both the mandate and the state periods. The aggregate relationship between
12
immigration and economic growth are seen through the correspondence of
immigration and growth of capital stock as well[Ref. 5] .
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Figure 1
Immigration and growth of GNP, 1922-1982
Source; Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy; Maturing
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2.2 9.1 4.9 12.3 11.6 12.8
1964-
1972
1.3 8.9 5.5 8.4 7.7 8.7
1972-
1982
0.9 3.2 0.8 6.7 7.7 6.1
1982-
1989
0.5 3.2** i y** 3.1 3.4 3.0
1990 5.1 5.1** -0.2** 2.8 3.5 2.3
* Refers to the Jewish economy in Palestine until 1947 and to the Israeli
economy thereafter.
**GDP and GDP/Capita.
[ Sources for Table 2.2: For 1922-1982: Y. Ben-Porath "The Entwined Growth
of Population and product, 1922-1982" in Y. Ben-Porath (ed.) The Israeli
Economy: Maturing Through crisis . Harvard University press, 1986. For 1982-
1990: CBS, Abstract, 1991; and Bank of Israel, Annual report, various years]
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The trends visible in the data are of correlated increases of GNP and
GNP/Capita with population growth. Similar comparisons in the United States
show equally discernable trends (Kuznets and rubin (1954) and Kuznets
(1958)).
L. ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
One of the most important features of Israel's economy is the central role
played by the government in its wide interpretation. That includes local
government, the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund (bodies engaged
in settlement ofimmigrants and purchase ofland). The government owns such
enterprises as railways, post office, telephone services, and has carried out
extensive public works. It also owns more than half the shares of over 100
corporations engaged in commercial activities such as production of electricity
and exploitation of natural resources. Altogether the government and its
various undertakings generate about 25% of the national product. Since the
Histadrut (the Israeli federation of labor), through its holding company
generates a similar share, private enterprise is the source of only about a half
of the GNP.
The government has also been responsible for the major financing of
capital investment. In the first 10 years of the statehood [1948-1958], the
government was the source of 50 to 80 percent of total domestic investment.
It exerts additional influence through various monetary control, very high
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taxation, subsidies and direct allocations. All these make government activity
the axis of the economy and endow it with the means of affecting to a high
degree every day life and well being of the citizens.
Governmental involvement in the economy has depended less on the
political philosophy of any particular governing party coalition, and more on
the underlying tasks facing all of Israel's governments: absorption of
immigrants, economic development, and meeting national defense needs.
The highly regulated economy can be thought of as having several
underlying reasons; the ideological, pragmatic and psychological.
The socialist orientation and concurrent visions of resource allocations,
have penetrated deep into the Israeli mindset. As the early Workers' Unions'
took the roles of political leadership and later became formal governing bodies
they brought with them their early ideologies. It was extremely difficult for a
society which had no previous independent experience to forego the methods
which through centralization and effort pooling brought about the creation of
the state. As immigration waves continued and economic hardships followed,
it was only natural to continue policies which worked in the past and secured
perceived economic success without compromising equity issues.
The pragmatic reason was the imminent security threat hovering above
Israel's existence. The extent of resource allocations to defense required
centralization and regulation. Ensuring adequate manpower enlistment both
in the regular and reserve military units allowing for rapid deployment was
17
paramount. Infrastructure development had to align with the requirement for
rapid mobility of forces, to and from different theaters of battle. Industrial
production was to allow for military hardware output should an embargo
persist (as has been the case until this day).
A different point, which is more of the psychological nature, is the
historical paradigm haunting Jews throughout the ages. Ever since the biblical
times up to the holocaust in WW-II, Jews perceived their vulnerability as
stemming from their inability to organize their political and military powers
to resist threats. This perception leads to a consensus on the need to rally
around the flag in times of danger.
Thus we see several elements which lead to expectations and policies of
centralized and regulated planning. This includes both the economic and social
realms. Chapter VIII will deal with the changes necessary to change the
centralization paradigm.
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III. SOVIET JEWRY CHARACTERISTICS
This chapter will discuss the causes of the mass immigration and special
characteristics of the immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Two striking
facts stand out and merit emphasis. One being their level of education which
is extraordinarily high by any standard - some 57 percent of immigrants have
post-secondary education and some 16 percent have studied for 16 years or
more. The other, their lack of Jewish identity which can be expected to affect
their socialization processes.
A. CAUSES OF SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION IN THE 90'S
The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe has had ripple effects on the lives of hundreds of millions of people.
Destabilization in the political economic and social structures in those areas,
coupled with long subdued undercurrents of ethnic unrest caused waves of
migrations within and out of the former Soviet block.
The migration of Jews from the former USSR is a result of several
factors.
1. SOVIET IMMIGRATION POLICY
In 1989 then President Gorbachev changed the binding rules of
immigration, allowing a large exodus of Jews with few if any restrictions on
the potential immigrants. Along with his concurrent policy of 'Glasnost' he was
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trying to appeal to western support in a desperate attempt to save the Soviet
economy from crumbling.
2. SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS
With the deterioration of the Soviet political infrastructure the
threat to exit visa seekers in terms of abuse and harassment - typical in
previous years - declined considerably. In the past, a visa applicant risked his
economic security and job retention without a sound probability that his exit
will be permitted. It was almost ignored by 1989 as the political and internal
security police attended to other problems - mainly their own survival.
3. SOVIET ECONOMY
By 1989 the Soviet economy was deteriorating at a rate which
signalled an imminent crisis. As food prices and general inflation increased,
the Jews anticipated that their well being will be jeopardized as parts of the
population and in their special capacity as Jews being restricted to certain
occupational fields by the Soviet system.
4. ANTI-SEMITISM
The economic, social and ethnic situation in the former Soviet Union
generated anti-semitic attitudes throughout the country, but particularly in the
Russian Republic. Anti-semitic papers with large circulation were freely
distributed, and their propaganda was becoming more extremist, with
accusations against Jews - of economic, ideological and political nature - with
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strong religious overtones. In many Russian cities, painting on walls of anti-
semitic slogans and swastikas had become common.
Islamic fundamentalism was causing concern among Jews in the
relevant republics, of impending hostilities generated by local ties with hostile
Arabs. As an example, in Georgia by 1991, all cooperation between the
government and the Jewish Agency (a quasi official Israeli agency which deals
with Jewish immigration worldwide) has been stopped. It was due to the
apprehension of that Republic's president that such cooperation may be
regarded as pro-Israeli policy by the Arab states [Ref. 6]
By the end of 1989 the Soviet Jewry was in a position of physical
and mental readiness to leave. Israel has furnished the infrastructure within
the Soviet Union (via the Jewish Agency) to process the visa applicants and
make arrangements for their transit to Israel. Israel has also promoted Jewish
education and Hebrew language tuition throughout local communities in the
former USSR.
B. POPULATION ACCUMULATION
Israel's population growth was characterized by large waves of refugee
oriented immigrants. Between 1949-1951 the population doubled from 600,000
to 1,200,000 by incorporating Jews from Middle Eastern countries, mainly Iraq
and Morocco. In the 60s the immigration was mainly from Romania and in the
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early 70s some 100,000 came from the former U.S.S.R. Figure 2 Shows the
population accumulation in Israel from 1920 to 1990 [Ref. 7].
The current wave ofimmigration totals about 500,000 people (as of 1993).
As with most of the previous immigration waves the material assets with
which the immigrants arrive are negligible and constitute difficulties which
will be discussed in later chapters.
The rate of monthly immigration decreased in 1991. The slowdown was
due to the Gulf war and the absorption difficulties in Israel (These will be
discusses in Chapters V and VI). The rate decreased further in 1992 as the
immigrants related their problems to other potential immigrants. Figure 3
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Figure 2
Immigration to Israel, 1948-1992
Figure 3
Current immigration to Israel,
1990-1993
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C. SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD
Immigrants from the former Soviet Union have a particularly high
proportion of singles and childless couples. As a result, the average immigrant
household numbers 2.3 persons, in contrast to the average Israeli household
which in 1989 numbered 3.6 persons.
TABLE 3.1
ISRAELI POPULATION AND IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER USSR:
HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE (PERCENTAGES)
No. of persons 1 2 3 4 5 6+
Israeli population 1989 15.5 22.1 13.4 17.5 16 15.5
Immigrants from the
U.S.S.R in the '90s*
37.1 26.4 19.6 13.1 2.2 1.6
Average Persons per household - Israeli population - 3.62
- Immigrants 1990* - 2.27
Average, (excluding singles) -Israeli population - 4.11
- Immigrants 1990* - 3.00
* From Jan. 1990 to Sep. 1991.
Sources: CBS, Abstract, 1990; and Ministry of Absorption bulletin
D. AGE STRUCTURE
The immigrant population from the former Soviet Union is older than the
absorbing population. Only about one fifth of the immigrants are children
under the age of 14, compared with 32 percent of the Israeli population of
1989. In contrast the senior population of over 65 is 14 percent of the
immigrants compared with 9 percent of the indigenous population.
This structure will have an effect on the social services systems more in
the form of health care and less in the educational field. Another attribute of
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the age structure is that a large percentage of the immigrant population are
potential entrants to the work force; (and therefore will contribute to the tax
revenue and social security, partially offsetting the burden by the older
immigrants who are automatically entitled to all social benefits).
TABLE 3.2
ISRAELI POPULATION AND IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER USSR,







0-5 13.2 7.0 6.7
6-14 18.6 13.2 16.0
15-18 7.6 5.5 9.8
19-24 9.9 8.0 9.8
25-44 27.3 31.9 27.4
45-64 14.5 20.5 20.9
65-74 5.2 9.0 6.7
75+ 3.8 4.9 2.7
* From Jan. 1990 to sep. 1991
** From 1970 to 1983
Source: CBS, Abstract, 1990; and Ministry of Absorption
E. LEVEL OF EDUCATION
The education level of the immigrants from the Soviet Union, based on
the number of years of schooling, is higher than that of the Israeli population.
Some 57 percent of immigrants have post-secondary education and some 16
percent have studied for 16 years or more. Among the Israeli population the
corresponding relative shares are 24.6 and 10.5 percent respectively.
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TABLE 3.3
ISRAELI POPULATION AND IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER USSR,
AGED 15+, BY YEARS OF EDUCATION (PERCENTAGES)
Israeli population 1989 Immigrants from the USSE
Years of
Education
Total Jews In the 90s* In the 70s**
0-4 8.9 6.7 2.2 12.3
5-8 17.2 14.6 9.1 24.4
9-12 49.3 51.1 31.6 31.0
13-15 14.1 15.6 40.7 18.8
16+ 10.5 12.0 16.4 13.5
* From Jan. 199 J to Sep. 1991
** From 1970 to 1983
Source: CBS, Abstract, 1990; and Ministry of Absorption.
F. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Some 80 percent of the immigrants are of working age (+15) compared to
68 percent of the Israeli population. Their rate of participation in the labor
force, particularly among women, is high. Based on the experience of previous
waves of immigration from the Soviet Union the overall participation rate is
above 60 percent, compared to 52 percent among veteran Israelis. As a result,
close to half of all immigrants can be considered potential additions to the
labor force, compared to only a third of the absorbing population[Ref. 9].
26
G. OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION
The occupational composition ofthe immigrants is characterized by a high
proportion of academics and those in the technical, engineering and medical
professions, differing significantly from the Israeli labor force; some 25 percent
of the immigrants are engineers and architects as opposed to 2 percent of the
Israelis; 15 percent are technicians, compared to 4 percent; and 12 percent are
in the medical field, compared to 4 percent.
Occasionally the formal classification of occupations does not reflect
educational level and practical experience according to western criteria (as is
often the case with physicians who lack skills which makes many of them
ineligible for work as physicians in an Israeli medical establishment). It may
also be too general and covers specific specializations which have no immediate
use in Israel (an example would be the large numbers ofmining engineers who
find that Israel has no mining industry at all, for lack of natural resources).
In both cases additional training and adaptation are required, prolonging the
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Science graduates 0.5 1.6 1.1
Engineers and architects 1.9 25.0 14.0
Physicians 1.1 6.3 6.8
Pharmacists and veterinarians 0.2 0.6 0.3
Social Science and art graduates 1.8 5.6 3.3
post primary teachers 2.7 1.5 2.8
Total ~ professional 8.3 40.6 28.3
TECHNICAL AND
RELATED
Primary and junior high school
teachers
5.0 8.5 7.8
Social workers, artists writers
and others
3.0 6.1 2.3
Nursing and paramedical 2.3 4.6 5.2
Technicians 4.1 15.1 7.6
Managers 6.5 0.3 1.9
Total - Teckaieal and related 20.9 34.6 24.8
OTHER OCCUPATIONS
Clerical 17.6 4.0 9.3
Sales workers 8.4 2.2 3.8
Service workers 12.7 3.9 4.9
Agricultural workers 4.3 0.1 0.1
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Unskilled laborers in industry,
construction and transport 3.4 2.0 1.4
skilled workers 24.3 12.6 27.1
^ier occupations mm 24.8 46,6
TOTAL 100 100 100
* Immigrants in JNov. 1989 - Oct. 1990, occupation prior to immigration
** Immigrants in 1979 - 1983, occupation prior to immigration
Source: CBS, Labor force survey, 1989 (for Israeli population) CBS, 1983
Census (for immigrants in the '70s)
Ministry of Absorption bulletin (for immigrants in the '90s)
H. CAPITAL IMPORTS
The financial and material assets which the immigrants brought with
them are of almost negligible worth due to the low conversion rates of the
Soviet Rubble. The material belongings usually include clothing and basic
furniture.
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IV. ECONOMIC OPENING CONDITIONS FOR ABSORPTION
Following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Israeli economy had taken a
down turn. A slow down of growth ensued, coupled with balance of payment
crisis and severe inflationary processes. In 1985 a stabilization program was
adopted which produced favorable results on several levels but also led to a
recession. The economic conditions prevailing immediately before the large
wave of immigration are the consequences of these developments.
A. EFFICIENCY MEASURES
The stabilization program adopted in 1985 resulted in a dramatic drop in
the inflation rate, which fell from 17 percent a month to some 17 percent
yearly. A change in economic structural thinking initiated a process which
revealed extensive inefficiencies in many sectors in the economy, and led to
efficiency measures and recovery programs in various entities. The change
was marked by reducing labor input, improving managerial methods, and
cutting unprofitable activities. This was somewhat of a shock to the public in
that for the first time on a large scale, non private industrial plants were
closed due to unprofitability (1985). Government spending was curtailed and
as a result the market slowed down considerably.
It was a crucial turning point in the attitudes of both workers and
managers relating to accountability, job security and bottom line business
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philosophy turning from employment orientation to profitability and viability.
This was certainly a distraction from the underlying socialist philosophy
followed by all governments and the strong trade union.
In many cases, the operational crisis was accompanied by a financial one
which necessitated a revamping of the capital structure by writing off or
rescheduling bank loans. In some cases when the chances for recovery
warranted, the government would provide loans and loan guarantees.
The time and volume of the recovery and change processes were not
uniform across industries and individual plants. They were interrupted by
external events — the Intifada (uprising in the territories) which erupted in
December 1987, and the gulf war crisis.
However in 1990, when a turnabout in demand occurred, the business
sector was in a more favorable position to respond by substantially increasing
output and drastically improving productivity. The business sector's total
productivity increased from less than one percent annually in 1981-1984, and
1.2 percent annually in 1986-1989, to 4.4 percent in 1990. Efficiency measures
have created an improved base for renewed growth.
B. INVESTMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Achieving sustainable growth requires an atmosphere in which
entrepreneurs and manufacturers can expect a stable long term trend of
increased demand and profitability. In the absence of such an atmosphere in
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the late 1980s, the business sector's investment dropped and growth of
productive capital stock declined. Gross investment in the business sector
dropped 1.3 percent in 1988 and an additional 10.3 percent in 1989. The ratio
of investment to business GDP dropped from 18 percent average for the 1982-
1985 period to 14.5 percent in the 1988-1989 time frame. Together with
restricted government investment in infrastructure development as part ofthe
1985 economic package, the economy stagnated.
Better infrastructure, due to externalities, directly and indirectly
enhances business activity in the economy, and is a complementary production
factor for private business capital.
Thus these developments seriously undermine the economy's growth
potential and consequently it's ability to absorb additions to the labor force.
In 1990 there was a turn for the better and investments in most sectors
began to rise. Gross investment in business sector's fixed assets grew by some
22 percent and infrastructure investment by 19 percent. Obviously the
business sector was responding to increased demand which was mainly
financed by the government through it's various support programs for the
immigrants.

















Railway passengers (thous.) 3,300 2,875 2,475
Ships departing (No.) 2,904 3,176 3,629
International Air Transport
Landings









Telephone exchanges 143 189 260
Telephones 1,250 1,740 2,285*
International calls (mill, minutes) 64 135 320
Telephone lines per 100 residents 21.5 26.2 33.8
Data transmission lines (No.) 1,360 6£&> 16/705
ELECTRICITY
Installed generating capacity
(Megawatts) 2,737 4,062 5,055
Production at peak as % of potential
production 73.7 63.9 ' 83.3









Petroleum 7,399 6,292 7,259
33
Petroleum products 1,561 778 1,421
Coal 1 2,905 4,040
WATER CONSUMPTION
Total water consumption (mill.cubic
meters)
1,679 2,025 1,750
Agricultural 1,212 1,480 1,162
Domestic 368 442 482
Industrial 100 104 106
Source: CBS, Abstract, various years
Some interesting observations should be noted from the data. A
substantial increase in the number ofvehicles with no parallel increase in road
construction. This has led to an increasing congestion of the transportation
routes hampering business development. The ratio of cars per Km. of road has
increased from 45.6 in 1980 to 77.0 in 1990. The railway passenger volume
has decreased, suggesting low quality of service.
Communication data suggests a boom in that field paralleled by
infrastructure putting the industry in a good position in that criteria.
Electricity production has grown considerably but has not been able to catch
up with ever increasing demand.
The water usage grew very modestly probably as a result of media
campaigns raising the public awareness of water shortage problems. This
suggests an adequate water system for the time.
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C. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
1. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
R&D in Israel is carried out primarily in seven universities, dozens
of government and public research institutes and hundreds of civilian and
military oriented enterprises. Significant research is also performed in medical
centers and by a number of public service firms in the fields of electrical and
power research, telecommunications and water resource management.
Government and public bodies are primarily sources ofR&D funding,
providing financial support for well over half of Israel's R&D activities.
Relative to the size of the labor force, Israel has a significantly
larger number of publishing authors in the natural sciences, engineering,
agriculture and medicine than any other country. Figure 4 demonstrates the
productivity of Israeli research.Israel's industrial R&D is concentrated in
electronics (67 percent). Studies have shown that R&D intensive companies
have been the major source of industrial growth and exports over the years.
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Figure 4
Researchers Publishing Books/Papers in International
Scientific Journals: 1987
Source: Institute for Scientific Information, Current
Contents address Directory, Philadelphia, 1988
2. ACADEMICALLY TRAINED PERSONNEL
Israel's large reservoir ofqualified personnel is primarily responsible
for its scientific and technological attainment. The number of graduates in the
labor force is very high by international comparison.
Table 4.2 shows the Israeli scientific potential prior to the
immigration of the 90s in terms ofgraduate comparisons with other countries.
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TABLE 4.2
RECIPIENTS OF ACADEMIC DEGREES IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES
AND ENGINEERING PER 10,000 PARTICIPANTS IN THE LABOR FORCE







Canada 9.1 6.9 1.6 1.5
Germany 3.6 8.5 0.9 0.4
Israel 9.4 10.6 4.7 2.2
Japan 2.1 12.2 0.4 1.5
Switzerland 2.6 1.7 1.6 0.5
U.K 8.5 6.4 2.0 1.8
U.S 9.9 6.6 2.4 2.1
^Includes mathematics and computer science
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1987, and for Israel: Central Bureau
of Statistics, Recipients of Degrees from Universities 1988/89
D. STRUCTURAL REFORM
As mentioned before, the gradual change in the prevailing economic
philosophy called for a reduction in the government's strong involvement and
regulation of the economic activity. Due to size limitations and erected
barriers, monopolies and cartels developed, marked by low efficiency and
substantial excess capacity. Heavy governmental involvement set quotas,
controlled prices, and occasionally allocated imported raw material to various
users.
Opening certain sectors of the economy to competition was the step taken
from 1987. The energy sector was deregulated, petroleum imports were freed
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from restrictions and the prices were allowed to fluctuate according to world
market. The edible (food) oil industry was removed from the government hands
to private enterprises, the cartel was canceled and price control ended. The
same policy applied to fodder grain. In 1990 the policy was expanded to the
wheat and flour milling industry and agricultural products such as poultry, egg
and citrus. The policy implementations were made difficult due to entrenched
political lobby groups, but the substantial weakening of the trade unions and
the favorable public endorsement of the changes speeded up the processes.
Free trade agreement with Israel's major trading partners have led to a
liberalization of import restrictions. Price control was removed by elimination
of subsidies on basic food products, minimum bid tenders for sale of
government owned lands was abolished, and as mentioned prices of petroleum
products, telecommunication services and electricity fluctuate with markets
prices.
Concurrently tax rates were lowered, unified and simplified. Foreign
currency control and support of the Israeli Shekel were limited and allowed to
fluctuate.
On the other side of the coin although progress has been made of late, it
is still viewed as insufficient. According to Alvin Rabushka, a specialist on
Israeli economy at the Stanford university's Hoover Institution;
We're not talking about a productive private sector getting
more access to capital. We're talking about a public sector
that is already bloated, inefficient, and wasteful getting
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more resources, leading to more bloat and
inefficiency. [Ref. 10]
E. PRIVATIZATION
The potential for privatization has been estimated in 1988 by First Boston
Corp. at $5 billion worth of companies ripe for sell-off. The realized potential
in 1990 ($770 million) shows both the depth of assets and the slow sell off rate
suggesting reluctance of governmental agencies to let go due to parochial
interests.
The housing mortgage financing has moved to commercial banks at their
own risks. Private labor exchange agencies were permitted to operate in the
labor market and the Trade Administration, which had been charged with
procuring and importing various raw materials and products, has phased out
most of it's activities.
F. REFORMS IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
The most important element of the reform was the reduction of budget
deficit from some 15 percent in the early 80s to 3-4 percent in the second half
of the decade.
The government canceled arrangements enabling financial savings
institutions to deposit funds with the government (essentially a guarantee),
and purchase bonds on preferential terms. As a result the government raises
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70 percent of its borrowing via negotiable bonds compared with only 5 percent
several years ago.
Liberalization of capital flow restrictions, overseas investment and fund
raising policies, and foreign currency holding restrictions led to the exposure
oflocal banks to outside competition. This caused real short term interest rates
to drop to international level from 6 percent in 1986 to 2-3 percent in 1990-
1991.
All of the above mentioned structural reforms have generated basic and
far reaching changes which could be instrumental in creating an appropriate
base for resumption of accelerated economic growth.
G. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Table 4.3 shows the external debt situation. The debt crisis appears
severe in 1984, 1987. However data for 1990 shows an external debt situation
which is the lowest it has been for more than two decades.
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TABLE 4.3
EXTERNAL DEBT DATA - SELECTED YEARS
($ MILLIONS AND PERCENTAGES)
1977 1981 1984 1987 1989 1990
External debt,
net (end of year)










421 762 1,565 1,469 1,265 1,088
Debt service, net 1,135 2,005 2,765 3,209 2,956 2,916
Net interest
payments as %
of: exports 8 9 17 11 8 6
Net debt
service as % of:
*Exports
22 23 30 24 19 17
*Exports + net
unilateral
transfers 17 17 22 18 14 13
Net external
debt as % of:
*Exports 166 145 196 129 96 89





3.1 2.6 3.7 3.6 3.6
Source: Bank of Israel, Annual Report , various years
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As the immigration absorption process produces a gap in resources, (to be
discussed in a later chapter) the country's ability to raise capital abroad
becomes all the more important in terms of debt repayment capacity, and
therefore in its ability to incur new foreign debts. Nevertheless, because of the
magnitudes of the capital requirements, the improvements are likely to be
insufficient without additional support for Israel's international financial
status.
H. INCREASES INLABORSUPPLYAND RISINGUNEMPLOYMENT
During the 1970s and early 1980s, population growth accounted for the
major part (95 percent) of the increment to the labor force. In 1987-1989, labor
supply increased at rates higher than those stemming from population growth:
on the average, only 68 percent of the increase is explained by population
growth. The remainder is attributable to shifts in the age structure, education
level and specific labor force participation rates. This was most apparent for
women whose participation rate rose from 30 percent to over 40 percent within
the last two decades.
Unemployment rates in Israel-from 3 to 5 percent-have been low in most
years. The above mentioned relatively rapid expansion of the labor force,
coupled with economic recession and structural changes discussed in this
chapter, caused a sharp increase in unemployment from some 6 percent in
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1987 to 9 percent in 1989. In this respect the immigration wave has arrived
at an "inconvenient" time with respect to the economy's need for labor supply.
I. DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIES AND
OCCUPATIONS
The public sector's share of employment is exceptionally high, by
international comparison - some 29 percent, and is a burden on the economy.
In the industrial sector there has been a substantial shift toward a more
sophisticated human, and tangible-capital intensive technologies compared
with the labor intensive technologies so common in the past.
The occupational composition of the immigrants partially corresponds to
this trend but the sheer number of immigrants will probably necessitate
occupation substitution (a point elaborated in Chapter V).
The major sectors by economic branch are similar to European countries.
The respective shares are presented in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3





Industry 31 31 58 22
Agriculture 8 7 5 4
Construction 10 11 - 32
Transportation &
Communications




35 43 26 22
"Includes goods and services
Source: Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 1989
J. FLEXIBILITY OF THE WAGE SYSTEM
As part of the stabilization policy
,
the government tried with some
success to reduce the automatic linkage between wage movements and price
changes (known as COLA in the U.S). This trend has been supported by slack
in the labor market, and substantial downward pressure resulted from it.
Consequently the wage system became more flexible. In 1989 COLA
compensated for only 43 percent of price increases, in contrast with 62 percent
in the early 70s, and 74 percent in the early 80s.
Wage differentials used to be uniform in most denominations with
interdisciplinary connections causing low association between productivity and
wage compensation, in 1989 wages were determined either industry wide or
the plant level. In the 1976-1979 period an average of 67 percent of wage
increases stemmed from COLA, 13 percent from countrywide wage agreements
and only 20 percent were awarded on the industry or plant level. In 1987-1989
the corresponding numbers are 46, 46, and 8 percent respectively.
Inter-industry variance of wage has also increased, with manufacturing
industry leading with 4.5 percent. This reflects tighter link between wages and
industry profitability. A setback in that respect is the rise of real wages by 10
percent in the public services while the business sector rose by only 3 percent
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(1990 data). In any case a flexible wage system is conducive to absorbing
excess labor supplies.
It is important to note however that wage rigidity in the Israeli economy
is still high by international comparison[Ref. 11]. (Data source for this
subsection: Efraim Kleiman, 'Indexation in the labor market', in Ref. 11).
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V. THEORY OF ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION AND ITS
APPLICABILITY
Literature on the subject of immigration points to many similar general
attributes ofimmigrants in case studies in the western world. Traditionally the
countries having extensive experience in immigration absorption are; the
United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and Israel. The similarities
stem from the reasons behind the migrations, namely economic incentives to
migration coupled with political reasons. However in assessing the current
wave of immigration we should note two differences which make the Israeli
case unique. This uniqueness must be accounted for before we try to draw
specific conclusions from the general theories.
1) The sheer numbers of immigrants as percentage of the resident
population, some 3.5 percent in 1990 and 3 percent in 1991 compared with the
highest percentage in U.S history 1.6 percent in 1850s and the beginning ofthe
20th century[Ref. 12] is one striking difference.
2) The education level of the immigrants and their occupational
distribution is unusual in its high percentage of skilled professionals whose
occupational mobility and its social effects are different from the ones found
in studies.
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In our assessment of the current wave of immigration we have data on
a previous wave of immigration to Israel in the 1970s of Soviet Jewry whose
characteristics were similar to those of the present wave.
A. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
The similarities in pattern oflabor force participation among the different
countries is striking. The data tells us that the participation rate for women
and older men are higher than those of natives. In Israel, where as in the early
70s some 53 percent of the civilian Israeli population age 15+ was in the labor
force, about 65 percent of the Soviet Jews in that age group were in the labor
force two years after their arrival (Simon, p.57-58). That difference of 20
percent while considered large, is probably accounted for by the compulsory
conscription of all 18 years old in Israel for 3 year (women for 2 years), which
delays their entry to the work force.
Table 5.1 shows that the participation rate for the 90s immigrants is
already high, and the data is somewhat premature, as it was taken less than
2 years after their immigration. However one can see the trends of high
participation rates will tend to follow those ofpast immigrants from the USSR.
Therefore the effect on the labor market will be of an addition of a greater
number of entrants than the traditional veteran rate.
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TABLE 5.1
ISRAELI POPULATION AND IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER USSR,




Immigrants from the USSR
In the '90s* In the 70s**
Total 52.0 56.3 65.6
Male 63.0 67.4 78.6
Female 41.3 47.0 No data
15-17 12.1 13.5 No data
18-24 41.3 55.6 No data
25-34 71.0 74.5 No data
35-44 75.7 75.1 No data
45-54 70.8 76.5 No data
55-64 49.2 44.5 No data
65+ 13.2 7.6 No data
Persons employed in the labor force
Total 91.1 70.7 92.7
* Immigrated Jan-June, 1990, in Jan-april, 1991
**Immigrated 1973-1974, 5 years after arrival
Source: CBS, Abstract, 1990,1991
CBS: "Immigrants from the USSR - the first five years in Israel" special series
No. 682, 1982
B. UNEMPLOYMENT
The unemployment levels among immigrants generally follows the
veteran population unemployment rate. Their lack of comparative skills owing
to language and culture differential, is compensated by greater wage flexibility
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and occupational mobility. The immigrants are willing to move geographically
and thus are more adaptive to market fluctuations. In 1972-3, 66 percent of
the Soviet immigrants who were in the labor pool found jobs within two
months. Within one year of arrival, 90 percent of those in the labor force who
came in 1971-1972 were employed (95 percent for males). This reflects the low
unemployment rate at the time (some 3 percent), and the immigrant's
eagerness to find work.
The current unemployment rate in Israel hovers around 10-11 percent
(April 1993) and reflects both the state of the economy and the influx of
entrants into the labor force. The unemployment among the immigrants is
substantially higher. Ifwe recall the high percentage ofgovernment employees
in Israel (some 30 percent) the unemployment prospect becomes worse, because
keeping the unemployment level at a manageable rate (preventing social
unrest and poverty pockets) by initiating public works means public burden.
C. JOB DISPLACEMENT
If the numbers of jobs are fixed, and the immigrants occupy some jobs,
there are fewer available jobs for natives. "Displacement" of natives by
immigrants is the most emotional and politically influential fear about
immigration. As the Committee for The Economic Development of Australia
put it, "no issue fires the debate about immigration more than its alleged effect
on unemployment in Australia" [Ref. 13].
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The following Interview with Jacque Chirac, Prime Minister of France
illustrates the point further;
Chirac:...for several years now, and particularly since 1981, large
numbers ofimmigrants have been arriving in France. Given the economic
situation, there are too many of them. Their numbers will thus have to
decline.
Liberation [A Paris daily newspaper]: Can you assert that there is a link
between the number of immigrants and the economic situation?
Chirac: Naturally, if there were fewer immigrants, there would be less
unemployment, fewer tensions in certain towns and neighborhoods, a
lower social cost.
Liberation; That has never been formally proven.
Chirac: It is easy to imagine, nevertheless. This means that we must not
accept any new immigration and we must severely curb illegal
immigrants, rigorously apply laws of the Republic, systematically expel
those whose status is irregular ... [Ref. 14].
In Germany: About 50 percent of the West Germans surveyed worried
that the East Germans are crowding the job market. [Ref. 15]
In the U.S during 1982 Congressional discussion;
Ray Denison, chief lobbyist for the AFL/CIO, disclosed that the labor
federation will oppose the bill unless it's assured that the Reagan
administration and a majority of the house endorse proposed restrictions
on the U.S hiring of foreigners as temporary workers... the AFL-CIO long
has been the prime backer of the bill's main element, which would make
the hiring of illegal aliens by U.S employers a federal
offence.[Ref. 16]
The quotations show the anxiety level which is generated by immigrants
competing with natives for jobs. Two forces in the labor market are at work.
On the one hand, a crowding effect will cause longer queuing for jobs and lower
rates of successful applications. This short run phenomenon has a congestion
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effect which promotes unemployment and lowers wages. The long run effect
is higher productivity and with the effect of economies of scale should induce
growth of the job market.
In Israel, the immigrants are crowding out Israeli workers at the lower
end of the social and wage levels. Although the decrease of Arab worker
participation in the menial job market has reduced the severity of the
situation, there are signs of hostility (see discussion in chapter VI)
D. OCCUPATIONAL SUBSTITUTION[Ref. 17]
The occupational mobility of the immigrants is an important aspect of
their ability to integrate into the labor market and social structure of the
receiving country. It affects flexibility in the labor market, productivity through
accommodation to market trends, and wage flexibility.
Although it is somewhat premature to assess the current occupational
substitution trends, there have been studies ofpatterns ofimmigrants from the
USSR in 1979-1981. These studies can predict the expected trends among the
current immigrants in so far as their demographic and occupational traits are
similar.
Relative to the Israeli labor force, the current wave of immigration from
the Soviet Union has a very high proportion of graduates in the technological
and medical professions who, if integrated into the economy, would make the
country's labor force the most highly skilled in the world. As an example, the
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proportion of graduates in the United States in 1989 was some 5 percent
compared to the corresponding Israeli figure of 9 percent. The latter figure has
risen to some 11 percent in 1993.
A considerable number of the immigrants of the 70s changed their
occupation even though there were no particular pressures in the labor market
at the time. The rate at which today's immigrants change their occupation is
expected to increase due to the following reasons:
1) The large scale immigration which accounts for an average labor
annual growth of 4.5 percent out of an overall growth rate of 6.5 percent (at
least in the 1990-1992 labor market). During the '70s and '80s by contrast,
Soviet immigration contributed only 0.5 percent.
2) Job seekers among the current wave of immigration are
confronted by a labor market where the unemployment rate is some 10-11
percent, compared with an annual average of 3.3 percent in the '70s.
3) The high number of graduates must be taken into account when
assessing their potential occupational distribution in the Israeli economy.
Particularly noticeable is the fact that over 60 percent of these graduates are
engineers and architects.
Among those arriving in previous waves of immigration, some 40 percent
who entered the Israeli labor market changed their occupation (this compared
to 15 percent of Israelis who have changed their occupation in the 5 years prior
to 1989). The rate of substitution among graduates (not including doctors in
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the medical profession) was around 42 percent. The rate of substitution in the
medical profession was 3 percent for doctors and 15 percent for paramedics.
Other occupational fields experienced 54 percent substitution (accounting,
journalism, management).
Table 5.2 shows occupational substitution trends. The medical field is
presently saturated and therefore will probably force high substitution rates.
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TABLE 5.2 - OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 1979-1981
IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL, AND
















Percent 100.0 100.0 63.6 ++
1 Graduates in the
natural sciences
1.2 0.7 60.1 1-6
2 Engineers 16.1 11.2 65.0 1-6
3-4 Doctors &
pharmacists




2.7 1.0 29.4 1-6
6 Teachers in higher
education
3.4 3.1 76.1 1-6
7 Teachers 7.8 5.1 56.7 6-7
8 Accountants/journalis
ts




10 Technicians 8.0 8.0 61.5 1-
10






12 Clerical workers 8.8 10.9 56.8 11-
12




14 Service workers 4.4 6.8 63.6 12-
14
15 Agricultural workers 0.1 0.9 0.0 15
16 Manual workers 1.2 5.7 26.7 16
17 Skilled workers 27.9 32.4 71.8 17
*(A) *(B)
1-6 Graduates 29.1 21.7 68.7 68.7
Not including doctors 23.4 16.0 62.2 62.2
7-12 Intermediate white
collar professionals
34.7 31.0 57.6 64.8
Not including nurses 29.0 25.6 52.3 61.2
13-17 Blue collar workers 36.3 47.5 65.1 89.2
+ Definition of "retention" within the occupational group
++ According to the collective definition described below
*A Occupational retention rate as defined above for each occupation.
*B Occupational retention rate in the expanded occupational groups:
"Graduates", "Intermediate professions" & "Blue collar workers"
Source: CBS, 1983 population and housing census figures
The trend showed downward mobility where engineers became
technicians, technicians became skilled manual workers, and skilled workers
generally moved over to the service sector. A similar pattern was observed
among the approximately 250,000 Soviet Jews who immigrated to the United
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States in the '70s and '80s. Part of the downward trend is due to the
redefinition ofimmigrant's occupation which more accurately conforms to local
(western world) occupational classification.
Occupation retention rate is determined by the suitability to the Israeli
economy and the amount of additional investment necessary (training). Thus
those in the medical profession, teaching profession (especially in non-
university higher education), and skilled workers, retained their jobs in
accordance with the labor market demands.
A common factor among those retaining their occupation was a higher
educational background and higher income. This suggests that the market was
able to choose the better qualified of the professionals (There is a positive
correlation between education level and income, and occupational retention)
It should be noted that there are differences in the occupational
distribution between the analyzed population and the current immigrants. The
latter portray higher rates of graduates. For example some 25 percent
engineers compared with 14 percent in the previous immigration wave.
Structural changes within the Israeli economy will be affected by the
availability of a highly educated, technically oriented work force. It is also a
rare opportunity to initiate structural changes to accommodate the human
capital embodied in the immigrants. The trend toward non tradable and
service goods is supportive of the occupational distribution.
56
Short term bottle necks are expected due to the need for an increased
stock of capital and a suitable scale of investment, and the time lapsing until
investments yield results. Meanwhile until an expansion of capital stock takes
place it can be assumed that the immigrants will undergo vocational training
in order to work in the service sector (mostly public sector) where the
capital/labor ratio is lower.
The obvious solution to the latter problem would be to direct the efforts
toward expansion of the infrastructure in order to support long term business
interests.
In the long term, the most important condition for achieving structural
changes in the economy and the development of human capital intensive
enterprises is a radical increase in the economy's exposure to international
markets (to be discussed in Chapters VII, VIII).
E. FERTILITY
As seen in the characteristics ofSoviet immigrants their fertility rates are
much lower than that of the Israeli population. The average family size of 3.00
(not including singles) compared to the veterans' 4.11 (Table 3.1 in Chapter
III). This means relatively low taxation on the educational system in the short
and long run. It also predicts a slow down in future growth of the entries into
the labor force due to natural population growth.
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F. MORTALITY
The mortality of immigrants reflects ethnic trends. There does not seem
to be any difference between mortality rates ofimmigrants and veteran Israeli
population.
G. EARNINGS COMPARISONS
Studies in the United States found that, holding other relevant variables
constant, earnings "cross over" - that is, catching up and passing natives'
earnings after 10-15 years in the U.S, (Chiswick, 1978, 1982). Blau (1980)
found that upon arrival, immigrants earned less than did native workers by
somewhere between 12 and 18 percent for men, and between 10 and 14 percent
for women.
Interestingly native whites with foreign parents earned more than native
whites with native parents, suggesting that there is a continuing positive effect
ofimmigration by way of psychological-cultural factors. One has to remember
though, that selective immigration policies can skew that effect by setting the
entry barrier so that only immigrants with a high level of human capital are
allowed in.
The case in Israel is that no selection is done at all. Israeli law does not
permit the discrimination of any Jew wishing to enter. Therefore the wage




Kuznets once remarked (Simon p.92) that it would be difficult to over-
estimate the economic importance of domestic mobility and its enhancement
of economic flexibility. It is logical that new immigrants should be particularly
mobile, because (unlike natives) they do not already have a stock of knowledge
of persons and institutions which make it cheaper to remain in a given place
than to begin anew elsewhere.
I. PROPENSITY TO START NEW BUSINESS
While studies do not as yet show particularly discernable trend, data and
anecdotal cases suggests that immigrants do have a propensity to start new
business to a somewhat greater degree than natives (because jobs in
government and education are usually not open to them). The Soviet
immigrants might be expected to lack this kind of initiative owing to the
nature of their economic culture background, which discouraged private
entrepreneurialism. Their expectation of job placement by the authorities
would stand in the way of their propensity to start new business. However,
although it is some what too early to find hard data, there are some signs of
entrepreneurship. In an article in the New York Times[Ref. 18] Yuri
Shtern who is in charge of immigrant issues for the Federation of Israeli
Chambers of Commerce, says "Russians have begun between 2,000 and 4,000
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new businesses in the last two years, each employing an average of three
workers, usually fellow Russians".
J. CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS
Studies show that children of immigrants tend to have a higher labor
participation rate than natives, and a higher propensity to start new business.
Richmond and Zubrzyscki[Ref. 19] show that the children of
immigrants earn much more than the children of natives. This suggests that
the children hold the same positive attributes exemplified by their parents.
The Richmond and Zubrzycki data (Ref. 19, tables v-5 and v-7) show that
Canadians with at least one parent foreign born, had substantially higher
income. For example; Jewish Canadians have not only the highest income but
also the highest differential between Canadian born parents and one or two
foreign born parents (25% difference). One explanation could be that as the
children of immigrants attain the language and social skills lacked by their
parents, they are in a good position to use their "inherited" motivational
background.
K. CRIME
While crime rate studies are very difficult to control for variances, data
on Soviet immigrants suggests that their crime rate is not low. Their alcohol
drinking habits coupled with high unemployment rates produced petty crime.
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Prostitution is not uncommon [Ref. 20] and may represent
entrepreneurial initiatives in an environment of high unemployment.
L. EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANTS ON PUBLIC COFFERS
Cost benefit analysis ofthe impact ofimmigrants on the public coffers has
to do with the imposition of burden upon the native population. Their use of
social services such as medical care, unemployment pay, food programs, aid to
dependent children, retirement payment and schooling expenditures.
Generally, immigrants use less than their share in such services, this is largely
due to the age composition of immigrant families, who typically are adults
arriving in the early prime of their working lives with relatively few children.
The case of the Soviet immigrants is somewhat peculiar. The age
distribution shows that in general the average age of the immigrants is not as
young as in other countries, and the proportion of older people is significantly
higher than other countries and in fact higher than the native population.
In Chapter III, Table 3.2 we saw that the percentage of immigrants aged
64-75 was 9.0 and over 75 was 4.9 compared with 5.2 and 3.8 respectively for
the veterans. This, coupled with the social services supplied - housing
subsidies, special rights of importation of goods, and acclimatization services -
are quite large.
Medical care - The large percentage of older population within the
immigrant group suggests a substantial burden on the already taxed Israeli
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health system. The taxation of the health system is mainly in geriatric care
and other health costs associated with increased use of the system correlated
to age. The generous health policy makes the system particularly congested.
Many of the immigrants are entitled to and receive pensions from the CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States) but its monetary value is negligible.
Retirement benefits in the form of social welfare is also substantial due to the
inclusion of the immigrants in the Israeli social security programs.
The next substantial compensation is the unemployment benefit. The
high unemployment has a direct effect on the burden.
These three programs are unique in that they directly fully tax the
veteran population which has to bear the financial consequences. It should be
noted that some of these costs are offset by charity contributions directly
connected to the immigration to the amount of about $1 billion, from sources
abroad (mainly world Jewry).
Taxes paid by immigrants, will in the future offset some of the burden.
The higher labor participation rate promises to shift a higher relative
contribution ofthe immigrants to tax revenue than the veterans. This without
considering other indirect effects such as productivity, wage flexibility and
other positive economic effects to be discussed in a later chapter.
The high tax rates in Israel will make the immigrants' contribution more
substantial at an earlier stage than in a low tax situation. An additional
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burden sharing characteristic is the participation of the immigrants in the
military allowing (ceteris paribus) veterans to serve less reserve duty time.
When thinking about the totality of the economic effects of immigrants
upon natives, one must take into account - in addition to the points discussed
here - both capital dilution (negative effect on natives) and productivity
(positive effect on natives). Data from the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, and
Israel (not including the current immigration wave) confirm that immigrants
use little services and pay substantial taxes relative to natives (Simon p. 128).
Because of their size, transfer payments have great influence on the
economy and public budget. Family structure - especially the presence of
female - headed families with two or more children, and old age retirement
recipients, are the most important determinant of the rate of use of transfer
payments (aside from social security, Medicare and other payments).
M. EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS THROUGH DILUTION OF
PRODUCTION CAPITAL
Immigrants obtain benefits from capital they do not pay for, and thereby
either reduce the amount of available capital per native, or force natives to pay
for capital to equip the immigrants. The effect can be separated into a public
segment and a business segment. Within the public sector many services which
are not congested should not cause a burden on natives.
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In the Israeli case the school system (due to age distribution) the military
and many social service systems would be able to service the immigrants
without placing too much demands on capital. Other systems such as: public
housing, social security, unemployment fund and Medicare, are heavily taxed
and will certainly require additional capital in order to supply the same level
of service, or even to survive severe deterioration which could result in social
and political unrest.
The business sector should benefit greatly from the immigrants. In a
theory explained by Yeager (1958), Borts and Stein (1964), and Berry and
Soligo (1969)[Ref. 21] they emphasize a lesson about the aggregate
effect; if immigrants do not own the physical capital with which they work,
natives as a whole benefit because of the additional returns earned by the
capital, (though "workers" qua workers lose because their wages go down). If
there is no congestion in the business sector (as there rarely is) then
productivity should increase. In the Israeli case the increased flexibility of the
wage system coupled with the increase of the average "quality" of human
capital present in the job market, should enhance the business sectors'
productivity in the long run. In the short run vocational training and language
and cultural difficulties may slow the positive effects mentioned.
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N. HUMAN CAPITAL EXTERNALITIES
A person's output depends not only on the person's own skills and the
quality of the machines one works with, but also on the quality of the skills of
the persons one works with.
Immigrants from poor countries possess poorer productive skills than do
people with the same amount of formal education in richer countries; this is
almost defenitionally true, and the effect can be seen in the lower incomes of
those immigrants in the countries from which they have come than in the
incomes they expect in the receiving country (which is essentially the reason
they have come). Until they improve their informally learned skills - handling
modern communications systems, or getting used to doing things by telephone
and computer rather than in person and with pencil and paper - they present
lower quality human capital for their native counterparts to cooperate with.
This will reduce the productivity of local workers until the immigrants -
perhaps in two or five years - pick up the informal training (after which they
forge ahead of the natives) (Simon, p. 183).
In Israel's case the theory should also hold true. Physicians have to be
retrained in modern methods, engineers oriented with computer programming
and technicians have to learn modern methods. All have to be indoctrinated
into the philosophy of free market and competitive venturing. Different
reward systems, motivational systems and the decreased role of government
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will prolong the assimilation, and surely cause stress and exasperation on the
part of the immigrants and the veteran population.
However when trying to assess the externality effect we have to realize
the human capital worth of the immigrant population in comparison with the
receiving population. Although difficult to quantify, we can use the criteria of
education level comparison and occupational distribution. Reflecting on the
data presented in Chapter III, we can see an exceptionally high level of
education and an abnormally high percentage of high valued occupational
skills (physicians, engineers, technician etc.). This would suggest a positive
external effect on the native population resulting in higher productivity.
Another aspect of this phenomenon is the new investment opportunity created
by immigrant scientists and engineers. This should in itself, cause capital flow
into the country from abroad to invest in these opportunities, which works to
keep the supply of capital per worker from being diluted. (This point will be
elaborated in Chapter VIII).
O. IMPACT UPON NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
Natural resources in the form of land, agriculture, and water are taxed
by the addition of immigrants. Obviously in the short run it will require
extensive investment in infrastructure. The systems which are not used to
their fullest potential will actually benefit through higher utility use rate. As
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we have seen in Chapter IV, the road network and power supply systems are
reaching their maximum use potential and will require budgetary sacrifice.
The water system in the Middle East - is a crucial constraint to development.
In September 1989, a report by the University of Pennsylvania said Israel was
already using 95% of its annual renewable water resources[Ref. 22]
and like Jordan, would outstrip its resources within a decade. However, as
Table 4.1 shows, the consumption rate has actually dropped within the last
decade, and coupled with extraordinarily wet years in 1991 and 1992 water
reservoirs have been totally replenished rendering the report somewhat
pessimistic.
Thus the educational, communication, and water systems, seem to be in
a fairly adequate shape not requiring extra ordinary supplementary funding
due to immigration. (The education system does require expansion due to age
structure changes in the veteran population).
Pollution rates in Israel are relatively low (except in the northern
industrial center), and do not constitute a severe problem in any case since
Israeli heavy industry is quite limited.
P. CONCLUSION
The effects ofimmigration are far reaching in many disciplines; the labor
market, housing
,
and social services being the ones challenged in the short
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run, and the economic, social and cultural structures being affected in the long
run.
Studies in the western world have shown that immigration is a
contributing factor economically, provided some kind of a discriminating
control mechanism is instituted. These mechanisms are usually age,
educational, financial or cultural based. These policies bring immigrants who
are eager to work hard at a low cost and at very low social costs in terms of
state supplied benefits. In turn the immigrants arriving at the prime of their
productive life, subsidize their native counterparts by contributing through
taxes more than they take. Thus the base ideology of the absorbing countries
is to use the immigrants as a leverage for economic advantage. The assumption
is that the immigrants are better off than in their original country and they
had taken a risk and are willing to pay a high price (in terms of working
conditions, salary etc.).
The situation in Israel is fundamentally different. It is trying to attract
Jews to emigrate and make Israel their homeland. The higher the
qualifications of the immigrants the more chances there are that other
countries would be interested in them. At the same time the economic
opportunities in Israel are limited to only a moderate flow of immigrants who
can supplement the Israeli labor force.
The characteristics of the immigrants are uncommon in their age
distribution, having a high percentage of elderly. The Israeli system of social
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benefits to which they are entitled and the subsidies provided by the state
coupled with the economic limits of a small scale market and a non flexible
(downward) compensation system, taxes the Israeli economy very heavily in
the short to medium run. In the long run, all the arguments supporting the
assumption of positive outcomes of immigration, are present in the Soviet
Jewish immigration. These are productivity increases, through higher human
capital intensive labor force, matching of the labor force attributes to high tech
shifts in world commerce, and economies of scale which are very important in
a small semi-secluded country.
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VI IMMIGRATION ABSORPTION 1989-1992 THE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES
The massive immigration which started in the end of 1989 caught Israel
by a "surprise". The surprise had several elements, political, economic, cultural
and others which led to a mediocre performance concerning the capitalization
on the human "prize" given the state of Israel.
The immigration wave engulfed Israel at a time when its internal and
external environments were transforming.
An Arab uprising (Intifada) in the territories was straining the public
consensus on the political and humanitarian question of the relationship
between the territories and Israel. It was becoming clear that the Israelis will
have to make concessions to the Palestinians in order to subdue the tension.
Israelis were becoming frustrated with the level of terrorism and resolve
displayed by the Palestinians.
The end of the Cold War and Desert Storm - with the psychological strain
of being passively subjected to Scud missile attacks in 1991 - presented the
Israelis with a new external environment. It removed the threat of possible
imminent attack by its enemies. This allowed a deliberation on the prospect
of an end to belligerency and perpetrated confusion within the public
pertaining to the chances and dangers of political settlements in the area.
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A consensus on economic strategy was slowly building while
implementation was hampered by strong interest groups. The strategy of
opening the market to competition was adopted by the trade unions but as the
government did not display clear leadership, the power groups were slowing
reforms (although none of them had ideological motives).
The public was showing frustration with the political system. It perceived
a lack ofleadership, consistency, and accountability in the public sector. It was
coupled with media expositions of interest groups and inadequacies in the
public sector. Thus it has become very difficult to rally the public toward any
cause, including immigration absorption. The public did however rally around
a popular call for a change in the electoral system which was perceived to be
a cause of many of the inadequacies in the Israeli society. (In spite of the
Labor party's support for the change, too many powerful interest groups
opposed it and progressive legislation of the electoral system is still
gridlocked.)
A. THE POLITICAL ASPECT
The Israeli political machinery suffered from gridlock and stagnation for
several years before the wave ofimmigration started in 1989. The government
was comprised of the two biggest political parties, the Labor and Likud, who
were forced into coalition by the indecisiveness of the elections. Coupled with
the natural rivalries of left and right, were the powers of smaller political
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forces representing different interest groups, playing the bigger parties against
each other. In 1989 the Likud party (the leading partner in the coalition) was
internally weakened by factionalization and personal rivalries. Several top
ministers challenged the prime minister's authority and were busy creating
political power bases and public support for their own agendas.
(The Israeli political system is essentially winner never takes all, and
interest groups have a much larger share than their respective representation.
There has never been a government which was not a coalition of some sort for
lack of decisiveness in the 13 elections held since 1948.)
The gridlock resulted in fundamental flaws in governing.
1) Decision making - The government was paralyzed in that sense
and had made decisions in a reactive manner and only after public pressure
when it was no longer possible to delay. Committees had to be bipartisan,
bringing rivalries and power clashes to every facet of decision making.
2) Implementation - once decisions had been made, they met with
bureaucratic inept systems. Those were very slow in reacting to changes and
correcting mistakes (Since many functions are still performed by public
entities).
Probably the worst demonstrated case was the "division oflabor" between
the ministry ofhousing (headed by then minister Ariel Sharon) and the various
agencies dealing with policies for job creation and economic planning.
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Mr. Sharon had a political agenda in which he pushed for demographic
dispersion of the immigrants to underdeveloped towns and the West Bank,
essentially to strengthen those areas. His motives were genuine but political
in nature. Since private contractors were skeptical about the ability (and will)
of the immigrants to finance housing in those areas, Mr. Sharon agreed to
guarantee their investments and provide for infrastructure developments. As
a result thousands of housing units were built adjacent to small economically
fledgling towns. That included importing several thousand 20-30 square meter
trailer homes with limited life span.
It was obvious that the immigrants could not find jobs in those areas
since they had no industrial infrastructure and were already suffering higher
unemployment then the rest of Israel. Even though it was clear to the
government that the discrepancy between housing and job opportunity would
waste billions of dollars, and the Finance Minister (Yizhak Modai) complained
publicly that Sharon was using money and guaranteeing unappropriated
money, the prime minister was helpless. The political factionalization within
the Likud party had weakened the prime minister to an extent where he could
not interfere in the affair. In 1991 after realizing that Israel cannot face the
financial burden without internal political and social turmoil, the prime
minister (Yizhak Shamir) opted to ask the United states for $400 million in
housing aid. By that time Ariel Sharon was busily preparing infrastructure in
the West bank. When U.S. President Bush (through Secretary Baker)
73
preconditioned the aid on cessation of the infrastructure development, Mr.
Shamir was trapped. Were he to agree to the condition, he would play into Mr.
Sharon's hands proving that he was bending to pressure on an ideological issue
dear to the Likud party's heart. This would have undermined the prime
minister's position to a point where he might not have survived an internal
Likud political coup. Thus ensued another stalemate in which the immigrants
played a hostage role in a political power game.
The same logic was carried through when it was apparent that extensive
borrowing was needed (from the international community) in order to finance
the absorption process. The Ministry of Finance had calculated a need for at
least $10 billion loans and the U.S was asked for guarantees to that loan.
Internal political problems prevented the government from pursuing policies
commensurate with the interests of immigrants. Eventually this (as well as
other unrelated reasons) had caused the failure of the Likud in the 1992
summer elections.
Despite months of repeated emergency appeals by Jewish agency leaders
and other non-government immigration specialists, cabinets under Shamir
have failed to take decisive steps to prepare housing, education or other
services for the new population[Ref. 23].
In the summer of 1992 the labor party won the elections and presented
a more coherent policy in many disciplines including economic strategy and
immigration absorption.
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The Labor government is exhibiting surprising alignment along its policy
lines and is building political consensus and credibility in its political and
economic strategies (as of summer 1993).
B. THE ECONOMIC ASPECT
As analyzed in Chapter IV, 1989 was a year of recession and rising
unemployment. In 1990 as the immigration wave swelled, the government
appealed to world Jewry to aid in the absorption of the immigrants. The fund
drive raised close to a billion dollars, but it was clear that it was no solution
to the expected budget strain. The proposal to raise $450 million more in taxes
from an already heavy taxed population marked the first real effort to extend
the burden of paying for the massive influx of Soviet Jews to the Israeli
public[Ref. 24].
The package worked included cutting the minimum wage by 20 percent
for the employees first 6 months of work (from $521 to $417). The government
also proposed to place a 20 percent tax on certain types of interest earned by
pension funds. Also included was a 5 percent surcharge on income taxes for all
Israelis and raising the Value Added Tax (Vat) to 18 percent. But these plans
could not resolve the forthcoming deficit and the Israeli government had
assessed that it will have to generate some $30 billion to accommodate the
immigration. (Without causing severe setbacks to the standard of living which
would accelerate emigration and cause social unrest).
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The amount needed to absorb the immigrants takes into account the
direct expenditure and the indirect cost to transform the economy so it can
accommodate the large influx in labor supply.
Upon arrival a typical family of three is initially given $450 by the
government to rent a hotel room or cover initial expenses, as well as $650 for
"immediate household needs". The family also gets monthly stipend for rent
and living expenses totalling $700 a month - a sum that exceeds the average
Israeli monthly take home pay - and tax exemptions on the purchase of cars
and appliances.
This adds up to about $11,000 in government funds for a family during
its first year in the country, along with free enrollment in a six month long
intensive Hebrew course. The subsidy can continue for two years or more ifthe
family has trouble finding employment[Ref. 25] .
Having calculated the projected budget deficit Israel set on acquiring
favorable loans. The government requested the United States for a loan
guarantees in order to receive low interest loans from international banks.
The government presented its case through the Jewish congressional
lobby in Washington and professional corporations such as Solomon Brothers
(Israel: A Misunderstood Credit, Sovereign assessment group, September 1991)
and Furman Selz (Israel: The next Economic dragon. International Research,
Joel Y. Maryles, November 11, 1991).
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The case presented showed the Israeli economy's five percent growth in
1990 and 1991 as indicative of its potential. Net external debt has dropped by
over $2 billion since 1988 to $16.2 billion in 1990. Mean while, the country's
debt to export and debt to GNP ratios, key indicators of a nation's ability to
maintain debt service[Ref. 26], have improved in recent years.
A GAO report in February 1992 [Ref. 27] concluded that the
Israeli government will likely be able to fully service its external debt and
continue its past record of payments. The report also commented that there is
a substantial risk which would be minimized if Israel fully implement its
absorption plans. These include the rapid achievement of structural reforms
and a strategy to employ immigrants in the private sector, not in the public
sector or in public works programs. However in 1991 New York based
'Standard and Poor' gave Israel a low investment grade rating (triple B minus)
on long and short term government debt that would not be backed by the U.S.
Government.
Concurrently US officials were concerned of the need to back Israeli loans
under a provision of a 1984 US law in which assistance to Israel is not allowed
to drop below the amount Israel owes the US in repayment for past debts.
These, plus a history of slow repayments offoreign debts by Israeli banks,
has prompted the Export-Import Bank, a US agency that promotes foreign
trade, to give Israel a "D" level credit rating on an A-through-F scale
[Ref. 28]. As the Israeli economy continued to improve through 1992
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the change in Israel's government allowed Prime Minister Rabin to capitalize
on a fertile political field and acquire the US loan guarantees in his meetings
with President Bush and senate and congressional leaders [Ref. 29].
The Israeli budget for 1993 was ambitious in its deficit reduction
proposal. Meanwhile the economy is on a five percent a year projected growth,
inflation was held under 10% in 1992 (for the first time in over a decade) and
unemployment is around 10 percent. Most of the unemployed are immigrants
whose rates are around 30 percent.
C. THE CULTURAL ASPECT
Israel's absorption policy is directed toward fast economic and cultural
assimilation. Immigrants arriving in Israel receive a combined package.
1) Citizenship - Issued virtually at the airport. (Although it is not an
actual citizenship it is identical de facto and includes a voting right).
2) Housing - the immigrants are facilitated with housing or receive
a housing grant.
3) Living allowance - The immigrants receive a monthly living
subsidy for at least a year, until they find work.
4) Language skills - Immigrants receive free extensive language
tuition for a period of up to six months.
5)Vocational training - Free on demand according to vocation needs.
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6) Cultural training - Free and public initiated courses and tours
relating to Judaism and Israeli culture.
(The economic package was also discussed in the previous sub-section).
Even though the Israeli public was politically divided on many issues
there had always been a consensus regarding immigration. In that respect
Israelis had always been supportive of immigrants, willing to make economic
and social sacrifices. The many preceding waves ofimmigration had not caused
serious social unrest in spite of objective justification (job displacement, price
hikes, taxation etc.)
Israel has always been a country of immigrants with highly diversified
geographical roots of origin. This facilitated absorption of new immigrants
since there was always a large group of established population with which the
immigrants could align themselves and emulate.
The 90s immigrants are not different in many respects such as family
ties, language skills and ethnic similarities to a large Russian oriented veteran
population. There is a marked difference however, in their Jewish identity.
Many of the immigrants are not familiar with Jewish culture and
customs, and a substantial number of them are non-Jews who have married
Jews. Their motives for immigration are economic, and as such, their level of
effort to assimilate will be proportional to their economic success and perceived
chances of emigration to a better economic future elsewhere. Nevertheless
according to a survey conducted by the Israeli Ministry of Education (quoted
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on a bulletin of the Israeli Consulate in New York, Feb. 16 1993 #1371), 54
percent of the immigrants studied Hebrew in the former Soviet Union prior to
their immigration. This suggests a conscientious effort to assimilate in the
receiving country.
Many Israelis became worried that a cultural and political shift will alter
a delicate balance. Some rifts along ethnic lines became visible when protestors
took to small scale demonstrations. The immigrant influx coincided with rising
unemployment and their subsidies created a congested rental housing market
leading to high prices.
An interview with an Israeli unemployed truck driver of Sepharadic
orientation is typical of the frustration of the lower economic class;
We're being discriminated against,' said Nissim. 'The new immigrants
receive government subsidies for rent, while we who were born here,
served in the army and raised a family, get nothing. We want the same
thing they're getting; equal rights.' 'My parents lived in a transit camp
when they moved here from Morocco,' said Dorit, a mother of three. 'Now
we and our children are back in the same conditions.' [Ref. 30]
The politically divided Israelis became aware of the effects of the
immigrants on the status quo between left and right, as well as the cultural
implications. A prominent Jewish philosopher David Hartman commented;
This is an immigration of people without a historic identity. After 70
years of living under communist rule, they have no Jewish roots. So it's
an open ball game. They can go right, they can go left, they can become
fanatical or apathetic. The question is, how will they build their Jewish
identity here? Who will tell them the story, mediate their memory, the
right or the left? The Zionists or the ultra-Orthodox. What story they
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believe could be decisive for the future of the country. But if we don't
make it meaningful, they won't stay[Ref. 31]
The potential for unrest has not materialized perhaps because the
immigrants were not threatening the more established predominant middle
class. They were entering the labor market vacated by Arab workers from the
territories who held menial jobs in construction, restaurants, hotels and public
utilities.
A preliminary study on veterans' attitudes was done by Dr. Eli Leshem
of the 'Social Work School' in the University of Tel-aviv published in October
1992. It showed that according to research and polls conducted, there is a basic
resentment toward the immigrants in the Israeli public.
The perceived consensus with respect to the desirability of the
immigration is superficial in some parts of the population. Behind the positive
remarks there is often no will to personal commitment or living standard
sacrifice for the benefit of absorption. The immigrants are perceived as a low
priority item on the governmental aid list.
The latter findings are exemplified by the refusal of the trade unions to
accept taxation and lower minimum wages as a package to assist in the
immigration absorption. Although this can be viewed as a mistrust between
government and unions, the latter are quoted as saying repeatedly that they,
too, are happy that so many Soviet Jews are choosing to move here [to Israel]
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. But at the same time, they say they do not want to suffer economically as a
result of the influx of newcomers [Ref 32].
Culturally the immigrants assimilated at a fast pace. They acquired
language skills and did not tend to segregate themselves, geographically or
otherwise. Russian newspapers, theater and especially musical ensembles
sprouted where they settled. The large numbers of musicians translated into
cultivation of classical music which caught with to the native population.
Thus somewhat surprisingly the perceived tensions and emigration
expectations did not materialize.
The slowdown of immigration was due to economic hardships and that
eased the strain on both the housing and labor market. This coupled with fast
assimilation and positive visible effects of the immigrants subdued the
potential cultural conflicts in the Israeli society.
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VII PROJECTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE
A. PUBLISHED PLANS
The present government has formulated a strategy for immigration
absorption. The plan is basically an attempt to implement the previous
government's espoused programs. This in turn date back to the 1985 economic
program initiated by then Prime Minister Peres (the plan is discussed in
Chapter IV).
However, as portrayed, it is doubtful whether the government will be able
to carry its plan for the same reasons the previous one has failed namely - the
structure of Israeli politics might prevent a restructuring of the economy.
The governor of the Bank of Israel is a strong and independent figure in
the Israeli economic system (compared to other countries). His philosophy and
reflections can convey some of the thought and realities expected in the future.
The present governor's goals were mapped in a report in Business Week
[Ref. 33].
1) Reduce inflation to the 3.5 percent level of Israel's trading
partners
2) Open protected financial markets to foreign competition and allow
citizens to open bank accounts abroad.
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3) Get state to slash spending on housing and wages and boost
outlays for transportation, telecommunications and education.
However the governor's (Mr. Jake Frenkel) sober remarks in the
introduction to the bank of Israel 1991 annual report show a somber
frustration:
... This year's economic performance appears inadequate in view of the
need to expand and to absorb immigration, and the economy does not yet
appear to be on the track for sustainable growth. Such growth should be
based on utilizing the relative advantage of Israel's human capital and
realizing the potential offered by large export markets. The government's
task is to improve conditions for the business sector, enabling it to realize
its growth potential. This requires the consistent implementation of
measures intended to set the economy on the right path, increase
immigration and slow down inflation. First and foremost budget
priorities must be reordered, with the significant expansion of
infrastructure investment and reduction of business sector taxes. At the
same time reforms must be speeded up in order to improve the
functioning of the markets and reduce costs to manufacturers. Some of
these steps require legislative action and procedural simplification, while
others involve expenditure. Since there should be no deviation from the
deficit [reduction] path to which the government is committed, a
significant reduction of the budgetary expenditures is required. This is
possible only once budget priorities are reordered - something that is
needed now more than ever.
(Bank of Israel annual report 1991, Jerusalem, May 1992)
B. ECONOMIC POLICY PLANS
In examining the Israeli government economic policy presented by the
Likud Finance Ministry for the 1992-1993 period and the Labor finance
Ministry for 1993-1995 there are no extreme ideological differences. The
government policy plan is a joint paper[Ref. 34] published by the Bank
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of Israel, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry for Economic Planning (a
non influential ministry created in the past to accommodate parochial interests
at the time).
The economic policy will signify a change in the order of priorities.
1) Renewed initiative of investment in the business and public
sectors.
2) Increased rate of exports .
3) Sharp decrease in public expenditures for private dwellings.
(Public expenditure on housing was discussed in Chapter VI. A)
The economic challenge perceived, is to absorb most of the labor supply
by the business market. It is only possible by rapid expansion of the latter and
requires investments and developments of export markets. Most of the
budgeting will come from reallocation of housing appropriations.
Keeping internal and external stability is a constraint on the economic
plan. The immigration absorption caused instability in public sector budgeting
and budgetary deficit. This instability is expected to continue in the next
several years. The Loan guaranties should be used to finance the immigration
absorption and as moderately as possible. It is clear that use of loans for other
needs will lead to solvency problems in the future. The main items to receive
budgetary priorities are infrastructure and education.
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C. BUDGET PLANS
Planned expenditures for 1993 are 88.7 billion Israeli Shekels (about $31
billion), not including loans repayments. This compares with 91.1 billion
Shekels in 1992 which is a 2.6 percent real reduction. The planned domestic
deficit will be 5.9 billion which is about 3.2 percent of GDP.
Infrastructure investments will increase by 30 percent for 1993, mainly
in roads, sewage and water systems. Investments in power systems, air and
sea transport will increase by some 22 percent.
Education subsidies will increase mainly to finance immigrants and the
expected addition of students.
Taxing policy forecasts tax reductions of 1.2 percent. Liberalization and
equity issues are to be addressed, in January 1993 barriers defending domestic
manufacturers from competing imports were to be eliminated (this relates only
to EEC or US based goods). Other reductions are planned in an effort to lower
domestic prices which should limit the pressures for wage increases. In turn
it will improve employers and exporters profitability.
D. STRUCTURAL CHANGES
Structural changes are designed to increase the competitiveness and
productivity of the domestic market. This by lowering subsidies, controlling
government services, Anti-trust enforcement, and labor law changes. The latter
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include abolition of cross over industry wide wage hike agreements, minimum
wage reductions and a reform in the labor market management procedures.
The next item is privatization and competitive public service
management. Privatization is expected to bring some $1 billion in FY 93.
E. MONETARY POLICY
The main policy objective is the creation of a stable monetary market and
controlling inflation. Creating credibility in order to attract outside
investments and promoting business sector growth is the target. The US loan
guaranties are expected to lower interest rates but using them in other than
economically viable investments will only exacerbate the debt situation.
Critique of the government policy should be centered not on intentions
but on strategies of implementation. So far only incremental strategies are
seen. The pace of change is very slow and as long as the mechanisms of
impediment are not removed, the variance between plans and reality is
expected to result in "muddling through".
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VIII PROPOSITION FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING
Jeremiah, 3.18:
In those days the house ofJudah shall walk with the house
of Israel, and they shall come together out of the land of
the north to the land that I have given for an inheritance
unto your fathers.
Realizing the biblical vision is no simple task. It might take pragmatic
visionary leadership to successfully assimilate those who came from the 'land
of the north" as the prophet Jeremiah professed. The immigration wave from
the former Soviet Union has come to Israel at a crucial time in its evolution.
The Middle East undergoes political and geo-economical changes and Israel is
one of the key players. The internal changes in Israel are numerous and
include the political, social, cultural and economic disciplines. As the
immigrants enter the Israeli environment they become at once participants in
the struggle to shape the country's future. Their very presence and attributes
make them both a catalyst to change and a challenge to existing stake holders.
They become an important factor in a multi-variate formula which will result
in a new Israeli entity in the future.
This chapter will use strategic planning methods to formulate a proposal
for policies, which will capture the human potential embodied in the
immigrants and utilize it to Israel's benefit.
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The basic method will be a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats) analysis followed by strategy formulation
suggestion[Ref. 35]. Although the thesis is focused on the immigration
question, it cannot be divorced from other facets of life in a society, and the
resulting implications on other disciplines.
A. STRENGTHS
1. EDUCATION LEVEL
The most impressive traits ofthe immigrants is their education level
and their occupational composition. For reasons discussed later in this chapter,
the exhibited characteristics of the immigrants conforms to basic Jewish
culture which emphasizes learning and inquisitiveness.
Table 3.3 (chapter III) shows that some 57 percent ofthe immigrants
have 13+ years of education. This coupled with the high labor participation
rate already exhibited by the immigrants (Table 5.1) suggests a composition
of a highly educated work force. Superimposing those figures on the work force
structure in Israel (see Table 4.2) which was second only to Japan in terms of
rates of engineering graduates, we can conclude that Israel has at present the
most highly technically educated work force in the world (this presupposes that
years of education truly reflects a level of education).
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2. OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION
The immigrant's occupational composition corresponds to their
educational background. As Table 3.4 shows, 75 percent of them are
professionals or technical and related. Of these, 25 percent are engineers, 1.6
percent scientists 6.3, percent physicians and 15 percent technicians. Even if
we allow for some downgrading in the practical usability ofthe occupations the
added work force can still be considered highly valued.
3. KNOWLEDGE MARKET ENVIRONMENT
Israel's academic and research background is advanced by
international standards. Networks for applications and trade in the knowledge
markets already exist in the forms of publications, patent recognitions, and
global flow of scientific information.
As shown in Figure 4 (Chapter IV), Israeli researchers are leaders
in scientific publications in terms of comparative rates. This suggests a
developed networking of the knowledge industry. Another hidden aspect of
networking is the social ties with Israeli and Jewish scientists and
entrepreneurs world wide. Although difficult to quantify there are a
substantial number of Israeli scientists who emigrated (mainly to the U.S) in
the past. Jews Have traditionally occupied a large share of the scientific and
entrepreneurial community in the west (mainly in the U.S). These make for
easier communications through cultural homogeneity and empathy.
90
The supportive communication infrastructure is an important
advantage. Although not as advanced as the coverage in the U.S, it is sufficient
to allow easy flow through computer networks which have become a major
medium for information flow, and traverse geographical (and time zone)
constraints.
Earnings comparisons make Israeli technical work force very
competitive in the scientific and techno-engineering field. Salaries in Israel are
about a half of those in the U.S. (start up costs as a liability will be discussed
under the weaknesses subsection).
B. WEAKNESSES
The inherent weaknesses of the Israeli economic and social systems have
two dimensions. It is difficult to let go of policies and solutions which are
perceived in Israel as having been paramount in the successful creation of the
state and its physical survival in a sea of hostility. The underlying reasons are
discussed in Chapter II subsection L. The paradigm of the power of
centralization is hard to change. Nevertheless the immigrants bring with them
the realities of the failure of the Soviet system which was perceived as
powerful. This may help in loosening the hold.
A second dimension is the entrenchment of vested interest groups who
have high stakes in preserving the present situation. These are economic and
political groups who have been able to manipulate the system to their
91
advantage. These will be difficult to confront and may pose a greater challenge
than the first dimension.
1. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
A quote from a recent article in the New-York Times succinctly
points out one of Israel's main economic weaknesses; [Ref. 36]
After China's embrace of some free market policies and then
communism's collapse in Eastern Europe, Israel has the dubious
distinction of being derided by free market proponents as one of
socialism's last bastions.
Perhaps this is an exaggeration, but it does convey a major
impediment to economic progress in a world which is turning ever more toward
global market systems.
The cumulative effects of high tariffs and barriers on imports make
raw material costly and promote non-economic decision making to concentrate
on the domestic market instead offinding ways to compete in the international
market. The tax system is such, that direct taxes reach 45 percent and Value
Added Tax is at 18 percent. In addition there are high social security costs
imposed on employers and bureaucratic restrictions which have to be overcome
by entrepreneurs. All these are enforced by an inefficient bureaucracy which
is an economic public burden in itself.
Therefore startup costs and low profitability chances are
discouraging both investments and economic initiative.
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2. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
As outlined in Chapter VI.A, the Israeli political system suffers from
factionalization which leads to incompetence in decision making and
implementation processes. In that atmosphere interest groups aggrandize
power and protect vested interests. The interest groups are diverse in their
orientations but can be categorized into three main stake holder
denominations
.
The Trade Unions manage to control wages and labor laws. They
make wage flexibility and occupational mobility extremely difficult and thus
impede the natural response of the labor market to fluctuations and changes.
Those responses mandate geographical relocations and productivity
enhancements through the use of eager highly skilled workers (willing to work
for low wages).
The second group is the Union of Industrialists which monopolizes
the domestic market. Its interests of high entry barriers caused the
government to adopt only a slow plan ofimport tax reductions. As an example
- taxation of textiles from countries with which Israel does not have a trade
agreements, is 110 percent. It is planned to be phased out by the year 1998.
However due to pressures the Finance Minister agreed to postpone the
restrictions until the year 2000.
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To this The Bank Governor - Mr. Frenkel commented;
...The policy was publicly proclaimed as a seven years long phase out of
tariffs...the postponement will create a precedent in which the plan can
be viewed as negotiable...supporting non-economic investments in
activities not profitable to the economy, and whose gains to the
industrialists are due to the artificial barriers...[Ref. 37]
A third powerful interest group are the political parties which make
up the coalition. Having little loyalty to the prime minister they are often
looking for opportunities to manipulate the system for the narrow interests of
their constituents. They can often force the government into 'pork barrel'
spending. Their accountability is usually to their narrow field of constituents
(mainly ultra religious followers) who happen to be non-Zionists (and have little
interest in the welfare of the state) 1 .
Thus we see that political instability leads to low confidence in
economic planning, and reduces the attractiveness of long range investments.
3. SECURITY
Political and security conditions impede the flow of capital to Israel.
These include the persistence of a state of war with the Arab countries, the
boycott and the Intifada. [Ref. 38] Investors are reluctant to place their
money in volatile regions. Although a catastrophic war is no longer an
immediate threat, potential investors perceive Israel as being risky and non-
competitive (ceteris paribus).
Although this point warrants explanation, it is beyond
the scope of this work.
94
4. GEOGRAPHICAL SEGREGATION
The geographical segregation from potential advanced markets
makes competition harder on Israeli goods and services. The scale of Israeli
domestic market is not sufficient to generate large scale production, this
constraint is expected to diminish as the global market changes but it is
nevertheless not negligible.
C. OPPORTUNITIES-THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY
In Alvin Toffler's Tower Shift' (1990) a global change is envisioned following
the information revolution. The proliferation of knowledge through media
systems caused a fundamental change in the global economy. The creation of
wealth is no longer governed by material and muscle but by people acting on
information and information acting on people.[Ref. 39]
In the post industrial world money flows to where information and
production can bring about superior goods and services. Physical boundaries
are no longer important in decision making. Goods are produced with
components supplied world wide. Producers gather data and make decisions
with suppliers worldwide being able to electronically compete and bid across
continents.
The new wealth is characterized by the following attributes (adapted from
'Power Shift' (Alvin Toffler 1990) and class notes from Prof. William Haga's
'Information Systems' course, NPGS Fall 1992)
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1) The system for wealth creation is increasingly dependent on the
exchanges of data, information, and knowledge.
2) The new system goes beyond mass production to flexible,
customized production (even customized products at costs approach those of
mass production).
3) Producer and consumer are reunited in the cycle of wealth
creation, the customer contributes not just money, but market and design
information vital to the production process.
4) Number and variety of organizational units multiply, increasing
the number of transactions and information which must be generated and
communicated.
5) Conventional factors of production - land, labor, raw materials,
and capital - become less important as symbolic knowledge is substituted for
them.
6) Goods and services are modulerized and configured into systems,
which require a multiplication and constant revision of standards.
7) Slow moving bureaucracies are replaced by small work units,
temporary or "ad-hocratic" teams. Hierarchy is flattened or eliminated to speed
decision making. The bureaucratic organization of knowledge is replaced by
free - flow information systems.
8) Workers become less and less interchangeable. They often own an
irreplaceable share of the 'means of production' in their heads.
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9) The new hero is no longer the blue - collar worker, a financier, or
a manager, but the innovator who combines imaginative knowledge with
action.
10) Powerful microtechnologies make it possible to do locally, what
previously could be done economically only on a national scale.
Points 3 - 10 are well suited to the attributes present in the Israeli labor
force. It has the potential to thrive in the new global market with its
abundance of qualified professionals.
D. THREATS
The threats present are parallel to the weaknesses. If Israel is unable to
reach a peaceful coexistence with its neighbors it will have to withstand severe
setbacks. Primarily it will have to expend large resources toward the military.
This includes both financial and manpower resources denied from the business
sector. An immediate consequence will be the containment of capital flow by
outside investors who would prefer a more stable environment.
Underlying political weaknesses could be another threat. They lead to
policy instability and might freeze or change the current trend of economic
reforms. Lack of constancy of purpose may lead to frequent changes in
economic policies and drive away long term planning and investments. It
makes interest groups and lobbyists more powerful in their dealings with a
bureaucracy and undermine credibility.
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E. A VISION
The Israeli state has found it difficult to formulate a vision since 1967 due
to lack of consensus in the population on many issues. As mentioned before,
political and cultural factionalization made it difficult for Israeli leaders to
follow other than incremental and reactive policies. As the geo-political and
economic forecasting becomes clearer, a consensus in the Israeli public can be
expected to crystalize.
In the geo-political context, it is becoming clear that a settlement of the
Arab - Israeli conflict is possible. The advantages of peace and the costs
associated with territorial concessions are becoming more tangible. This helps
in moderating extreme views on all sides of the political map.
In the economic context Israelis are learning that their economic system
is a burden on their future. The influx ofimmigrant job seekers, make it clear
that the choice is either to burden the public sector with creating jobs, or let
the private sector create them. As the burden of public sector financing would
be transferred to the Israeli public, the latter seems to recognize the urgency
of expanding the private sector.
Politically there is a consensus in the perception that a change in the
election system should take place making the executive more powerful and
accountable. Elimination of the inherent weaknesses - which give small
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factions and interest groups too much power, with little accountability - is on
both parties' (Likud and Labor) agenda.
But these visions are incremental in their nature and will take their
effect in a span of years or decades. The arrival of the immigrants, their
pressures and opportunities, call for a more decisive agenda which can unite
the Israelis and move them to a new sphere.
The characteristics of the immigrants coincide with basic Jewish Traits.
If there is one fundamental vision which was and is central to Jewish culture,
philosophy and practice, it is the primacy oflearning and knowledge. The basic
Jewish philosophy espouses that the world is a mechanism of reason and is
decipherable. It is through the pursuit of knowledge that one can acquire
wisdom which will enable him to understand his environment and influence
his destiny. A person can reap the benefits of his efforts in his own life time
and therefore entrepreneuralism is worthwhile.
Tracing the vision some thousands years back it is said in the Bible,
[Deuteronomy 5.1]:
And Moses called all Israel and said unto them, Hear, O
Israel, the statutes and judgments which I speak in your
ears this day, that ye may learn them, and keep and do
them.
The perception that knowledge and understanding become antecedent to
faith developed a "wisdom" movement in the old time[Ref. 40].
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Learning became a pivotal point in Jewish philosophy and culture throughout
the ages to this day.
Perhaps the perception is best captured in the words of the Bible,
Proverbs 1.1-6:
The proverbs of Solomon the son of David king of Israel; To
know wisdom and instruction; to perceive the words of
understanding; To receive instruction of wisdom, justice,
and judgment, and equity; To give subtilty to the simple,
to the young man knowledge and discretion. A wise man
will hear, and will increase learning; and a man of
understanding shall attain unto wise counsels.
Proverbs 2.3-5:
Yea, if thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice
for understanding; If thou seekest her as silver, and
searchest for her as for hid treasure; Than shalt thou
understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of
God.
And then the reward, Proverbs 4.7-9:
Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom: and
with all thy getting get understanding. Exalt her [wisdom],
and she shall promote thee: she shall bring thee to honor,
when thou dost embrace her. She shall give to thine head
an ornament of grace: a crown of glory shall she deliver to
thee.
The underlying philosophy of the importance of learning, the acquisition
of knowledge, is as powerful as ever in Jewish thoughts today. Therefore it
could be counted upon to be a focus for consensus to capitalize on. The
advancement of knowledge and knowledge based industry could be taken out
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of context of the usual constraints on changes, and elevated to a level of
national destiny for the Israelis.
Israel could strive to be a focus of technology and knowledge driven
industry. The basic infrastructure for this already exists. The abundance and
concentration of highly skilled professionals allow an intellectual synergy
resulting in high intellectual productivity.
The major fields would be: pure R&D, industrial and applied R&D,
innovative collaboration with manufacturing and medical research and
treatment centers. These will have the ability to attract capital and long term
investments from outside sources purely from a business interest standpoint.
In conjunction, industries could capitalize on the knowledge and translate the
knowledge into goods and services, benefitting from the geographical proximity
to the knowledge base.
The ideal of Israel as the "Silicon Valley" of tomorrow seems to be only
a question of freeing the potential from constraining policies, and not requiring
extraordinary initiatives.
Thus the proposed vision is to make Israel a focal point of knowledge
disseminating innovations for the use of technology for the betterment of
mankind. It will integrate and accommodate the values of Judaism and the
potential capabilities of the Israeli labor force.
The proposed vision is best captured by George Gilder in his book
'Microcosm':[Ref. 41]
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...The third great manifestation of the overthrow of matter is the impact
of this technology on the world ofbusiness. By overcoming the constraints
of material resources the microchip has devalued most large
accumulations of physical capital and made possible the launching of
global economic enterprises by one entrepreneur at a workstation, with
the overthrow of the constraints of material scarcity, gravity and friction,
large bureaucracies in government and business lose their power over
individual creators and entrepreneurs. The fourth phase ofthe overthrow
of matter is the collapse of the value of natural resources and territory in
determining the distribution of power among nations. The microcosms
of science, technology, and enterprise have converged in global
quantum economy that transcends all the usual measures of
national power and wealth. The most valuable capital is now the
capital of human mind and spirit2 .
F. PROPOSED STRATEGY
The 20th century can be seen as the age of failed experiments in socialism
- including its fascist, communist and welfare variants. While the task of
businesses is to take risk, the job of government is to be predictable,
government policy must keep hindrances to enterprises at a minimum and tax
penalties for the rewards of risk-taking must be low [Ref. 42].
The strategy for achieving the proposed vision would separate the
economic and social policies dealing with the knowledge and technology based
industries, from other economic disciplines. This would be implemented in the
various forms of structural entities.
1) Education - As the universities are the breeding grounds for
knowledge dissemination agents (students and teachers/researchers), public
'Emphasis not in the original
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support for the higher academic institutions should grow. As shown on Figure
4 in Chapter II, the universities are proving highly productive, as far as
published research is concerned and should be encouraged to continue the
trend.
2) "Existential knowledge zones" - Presently there is an idea of a
"free export processing zone", an industrial area where manufacturers are
liberated from normal taxes and bureaucratic regulations[Ref. 43].
This idea could be carried to an existential "knowledge zone". The industry of
ideas including high tech and R&D institutions would be liberated from the
taxation and bureaucratic impediments to productivity. These include
importation of technology related materials such as computers, related
hardware, telecommunication equipment, etc.
3) Labor policy - removal of labor hiring constraints and complete
wage flexibility. This type of arrangement already exists in one of Israel's
leading technological corporations - Elbit Ltd. This will allow capitalization on
the immigrants' capabilities.
4) Tax policy - While a preferential personal tax policy is
inapplicable for social equity reasons, corporate tax on revenues should be
greatly reduced to encourage entrepreneurs. Value Added Taxation of
knowledge based goods should be eliminated. This will greatly reduce start up
costs and will help proliferation of knowledge based technologies in the public
and private sector.
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5) Bureaucratic barriers - Although seemingly contradictory, in order
to remove bureaucratic barriers a strong institutional mechanism will be
needed to support the vision of the knowledge industry. Given a latitude and
mandate through legislative and executive power, it should be able to overcome
existing hurdles by supporting R&D investments through direct subsidies and
providing a coherent agency for entrepreneurs to rely upon.
6) Role of government - The flourishing of any industry depends on
its ability to maneuver and initiate. This can happen if an adequate
communication infrastructure exists. The government should invest in
transportation and communication infrastructure. This will generate lower
costs and higher productivity by lowering the friction imposed on the
movement of ideas people and goods.
7) Legislation - Regulation ofpatents, anti-trust policies, and general
intellectual property rights have to be revised so they can yield the greatest
social value. This means the dissemination ofideas and prevention of waste in
duplicate R&D while retaining proprietary rights [Ref. 44].
The expected benefits of the proposed strategy in the short term could be
the creation ofjobs commensurate with the characteristics of the immigrants.
It would lead to lower unemployment within the immigrant population and
lessen the rate of occupational substitution - and the related losses stemming
from the need for vocational retraining, and potential loss ofviable knowledge.
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In the long run it will galvanize the industry towards a competitive
position in the world economy and capitalize on Israel's strengths which match
global economic demands. It will also allow for a smoother assimilation of the
immigrants by capitalizing on their strengths. The policy has a financial
potential for economic improvement which is well worth the risk (though very
difficult to quantify).
The problems of the proposal are in the political and social realms. In the
short run it will create discontent among other industries and interested
parties which will resent the inherent inequity in the policies. Foot dragging
and delay tactics are expected at different levels of the bureaucracy as some
stake-holders will lose power bases and strongholds. Public support is also
difficult to anticipate as the policies tend to favor the haves versus the have
nots.
In the medium to long run a dual track economy is expected to develop.
Abuse of the system will undoubtedly occur and create suspicions, which could
only be alleviated if it was made clear that the whole economic structure is to
follow suite.
In the long run the knowledge industry's development will contribute a
growing share to the common society in the form of labor and capital infusion
through salaries and taxes. Thus the negative effects should subside. In turn
foreign capital can be expected to flow once the potential is realized and
investors feel secure that policies will be consistent.
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The problem of overcoming political opposition (in all its forms) needs to
be addressed by a show of leadership. Only a national consensus could
overcome inherent barriers to change, a consensus could be built by bringing
the issue to a public debate and with the support of the media and key
intellectual and political figures.
G. CONCLUSION
Israel has been given a rare opportunity to transform itself in a
revolutionary manner without having to go through the pains of turmoil and
violence usually associated with such changes. The underlying paradigm ofthe
power of centralization has brought the Israelis from the depths of frustration
and despair in this century to actualizing statehood and relative political and
economic success. It is that underlying paradigm which has become a burden
and liability.
The influx of immigrants coincides with the changes in global economics
and easing of tensions in the Middle East. The immigrants are no Trojan
horse. They bring with them human and cultural capital which can help
transform Israeli society to one which is entrepreneurial and innovative. In
capitalizing on Israel's strength the Jews may be able to become the beacon
their heritage had professed.
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